A cross-border co-operation in the hands of the EU and the national states?

A case study of the role of the EU, the national states and the subnational actors in the South Baltic co-operation

Caroline Hansson

Abstract

The overall purpose with this thesis has been to consider whether cross-border co-operations funded by Interreg strengthen or undermine the nation-state. A case study has been carried out, where the South Baltic cross-border co-operation has constituted a case. The result is based on material of nineteen interviews with stakeholders from five different countries representing subnational level, national level and the European Commission.

With the background of a developed analytical framework the establishment process and how different actors can influence the co-operation's opportunity to be maintained or deepened have been examined. The establishment process was analysed from a decision-making model inspired by John W. Kingdon. How different actors can influence the co-operation's opportunity to be maintained or deepened was examined from two different angles; the vertical dimension, representing actors from the national governments and the EU, and the horizontal dimension representing subnational actors.

It was concluded that since national actors to a high degree drove the process to establish the South Baltic co-operation and are the ones that primarily determine the cross-border co-operation's opportunity to be maintained or deepened; a cross-border co-operation like the South Baltic co-operation in the framework of Interreg, strengthens rather than undermine the nation-state.

Key words: Cross-border co-operation, Interreg, South Baltic, nation-state, establishment process

Table of contents

List of Figures

Acknowledgements

1   Introduction

Researchers in social science have extensively studied the changing role of the sovereign state and its alleged demise (Hurell 2007 p.197, Paasi 2002 p.71). It has been argued that national states "are hollowing out" due to a shift of power, which is taking place both upwards to an international level and also downwards to a subnational level (Baker 1996 p.44-45). Similarly it is claimed that the nation-state experiences "the twin threats" of supranationalism from above and regionalism from below (Donnan et al 2001 p.1). This thesis draws attention to the asserted power shift to the subnational level and examines it in the context of cross-border co-operations. The result from the thesis will hopefully contribute to a clarification whether cross-border co-operations can strengthen or undermine the power of the nation-state.

A cross-border co-operation is a co-operation between subnational units from two or more nation states (Perkmann 2007 p.254). Cross-border co-operations have grown in importance and have in recent years emerged within the entire European Union. There are several reasons as to why cross-border co-operations have become more numerous and why borders no longer function as they once did. To mention a few, the end of the Cold War created new possibilities for connecting previously peripheral border regions. Moreover, globalisation and the more knowledge-driven economy have reinforced co-operations across borders. In many cases it is argued that cross-border regions are a better creation of new functional economic spaces and are more natural economic territories than the states (Jessop 2002 p.37-39). The phenomenon of cross-border co-operations has furthermore been described as a strategy of response to pressures of economic globalisation and global environmental concerns (Scott 1999 p.606).

However, the EU's drive to greater economic and political integration is probably one of the most important explanations of the increased number of new cross-border co-operations within the EU. Different treaties and agreement have facilitated a rise of new cross-border co-operations. The Single European Act with its "four freedoms" of movement for capital, goods, service and labour, and the Schengen Agreement which resulted in the removal of systematic border controls, both constitute examples of how it has become easier to cooperate across borders and how national sovereignty partly has been weakened (O'Dowd 1996 p.11, Lavenex 2005 p. 460).

Most essential for the establishment of new cross-border co-operations is the Interreg Community Initiative. The Interreg initiative is a tool for reaching the European territorial cooperation objective (objective 3). This objective compound with the Convergence objective (objective 1) and the Regional competitiveness and employment objective (objective 2) are the three objectives outlined in the EU Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 (*Cohesion policy 2007-13 – Commentaries and*

official texts, January 2007 p.10, 20). The three objectives within the Cohesion policy have a total budget of EUR 308 billion (*European Regional Policy – The Basic Essentials*, January 2007).

The European Commission motivates Interreg funding aimed for cross-border co-operations with that competitiveness and prosperity is based on the capacity of the people to cooperate in forums across borders that share the same challenges. Problems are thus not always most efficiently solved at the national level (*Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength – Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion,* October 2008 p.3-8). Furthermore the Commissioner for Regional Policy, Danuta Hübner claims that the aims of cross-border co-operations are to put weight to the subnational level and promote a bottom-up perspective, where regional actors should be more involved in policy and decision-making processes (*Inforegio panorama*, June 2008 p.4).

The readiness of the EU to support cross-border co-operations has in several contexts been interpreted as a desire to undermine the national-state system. This can for example be illustrated by a statement made by the president of the Transmanche Euroregion: 'the European Union expects the regions to form networks, across frontiers, to enable them to counterbalance the power of member states' (cited in Jessop 2002 p.40). Also O'Dowd claims that the EU's policies acknowledge the weakening of sovereignty at borders and in some sense the loss of national state power (O'Dowd 1996 p.11).

Consequently, a question that follows is whether cross-border co-operations somehow can be a threat and even challenges national sovereignty. The aim of cross-border co-operations in the framework of Interreg is to promote a bottom-up perspective, but does this diminish the power of the national governments? Another parallel question that needs to be addressed is whether cross-border co-operations single-handedly have the power and potential to succeed or if their existence formost depends on the EU and the national governments.

1.1 Purpose and research questions

In line with the above discussion the main aim is to consider whether cross-border co-operations in the framework of Interreg are strong enough to undermine the power of the nation-state or whether they on contrary only may be an instrument in order to further the governments' own goals. A closer structure of cross-border co-operation, where subnational actors to a high extent are unified and where the EU and the national governments intervention is absent, is expected to constitute a wider affect on the power of the national governments.

The first question, which has a more theoretical character and will be the overall guideline for the thesis is:

Does a cross-border co-operation funded by the Interreg strengthen the participating states as a whole or undermine the power of the nation-state?

In order to respond on the first research question a case study will be carried out. The South Baltic cross-border co-operation established in 2007, between the subnational units of Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland and Lithuania has been selected as case, due to several reasons that will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

In order to answer my research question stated above two specific and operational research questions are considered to be salient. The first of these questions, focus on the establishment process in order to clarify the driven force behind the co-operation and furthermore the role of EU and the actors at national and subnational level. Particular interesting is if the establishment process can be described as a bottom-up or top-down process. A top-down process implies that it is the national governments that have been the driven force, and they would then probably not see the new cross-border co-operation as a factor that undermine the power of the nation-state. Deriving from this statement the second question is addressed:

What and whom drove the process to establish the South Baltic cross-border co-operation?

The third research question focus on present time and concerns what potential subnational actors have to maintain and deepen their cross-border co-operation compared to the EU and actors at national level. Once again, it is assumed that if the EU and the national governments solely influence and determine the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened, the cross-border co-operation cannot undermine the power of the national governments. The question identified is as follows:

How and to what extent can actors at the subnational level contra actors at the national level and the EU influence and determine the South Baltic cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened?

In order to examine the three research questions some form of theory is required, which can navigate the analysis. An underlying purpose is therefore to develop an analytical framework that is suitable for the posed research questions. The intention to study both the establishment process and how different actors can influence the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained or deepened is seen as crucial in order to be able to examine the first question. If the process was not driven by subnational actors or if the subnational actors are not compatible, to an extent where they by themselves can influence the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened, then it is not likely that the cross-border co-operation could undermine the power of the nation-state.

Consequently, if the EU and national actors have played and still play a major role in the co-operation, a top-down perspective may be the only force that determines the co-operation's future. The power of the nation-state is then assumed to be scarcely affected.

2   Methodology

This chapter firstly deals with questions about the selection of the specific case and secondly it draws attention to methodological considerations related to the thesis purpose to develop an analytical framework. Subsequently, the methodological chapter will complete with a discussion about the selection of data and interviewees.

2.1   Case study and the selection of case

In order to answer the overall research question two more operational research questions were carried out. These questions focus on a particular case since an intensive study of a single unit was considered as fruitful. Also due to a time limit and the fact that the evaluation is of a qualitative character it was considered to be appropriate to conduct a case study, consisting of only one case.

Opposed to a survey, which collects a rather small amount of information on many different subjects, a case study "refers to research that investigates a few cases, often just one, in considerable depth" (Gomm 2000 p.3). It has been argued that the method of case study is "poorly understood" and a "synonym for free-form research", due to its loosely framed definition (Gerring 2007 p.6-8). Nevertheless case studies may be the most adapted method in cross-border co-operation research, since it is particularly suitable for empirical investigations (Jørgensen 1998 p.52).

Cases may vary extensively and generalisations may only be possible after a high number of case studies (Gomm 2000 p.3). Hence it would not be possible after one case study to draw any general conclusions whereas cross-border co-operations strengthen or undermine the power of the nation-state. However, hopefully the case study at hand can contribute with one part to the whole research field.

Since the thesis does not strive for any generalisations, the selection of case is not decisive. However the cross-border co-operation South Baltic is chosen due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the South Baltic cross-border co-operation is selected as a case since it was established in 2007 and therefore the process took time in adjacent time, which makes it easier to research. The interviewees most probably find it easier to remember processes that are not too far in the history. Secondly, the South Baltic co-operation is also an interesting case since it is one of the few cross-border co-operation crossing land-sea borders and which consist of entitles from both new and old European Member States. These kinds of cross-border co-operations funded by Interreg had not existed before 2007 and are

therefore a new phenomenon which has not become any wider attention from other researchers. Consequently, this thesis seeks to provide new data about the conditions. Thirdly, how and to what extent different political levels may influence and determine the South Baltic co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened may also be most interesting when the co-operation is in progress, and when roles and structure are not completely clear. Fourth, the South Baltic is subject to a wide range of environmental problems. A shared problem and engagement for change at subnational level may be a solution to the environmental problems which the national states at this point have not solved. A final argument for the South Baltic co-operation as a selected case is the fact that five countries are involved. This implies that a wider range of perspectives can be collected from different interviewees.

2.2   The method of Structure-Agency

Due to the fact that the thesis has two operational research questions, it is necessary to focus on varied theoretical approaches in order to firstly study the establishment process and secondly examine how different actors can influence the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened. Concerning the establishment process there are already theories that can be applied and which only partly need to be adjusted in order to fit the phenomena under study. The last research question is theoretically more demanding and hence it is necessary to develop an analytical framework. This section seeks to discuss considerations connected to the method of developing an analytical framework.

   The analytical framework developed is inspired by the structure-agency perspective. According to Giddens, who represents one of the foremost in the structure-agency debate, structures are seen as constrains of what the particular individuals or organisations can do. Furthermore he also writes about structures in terms of "rules and resources" and what enable particular actions (Stuart 2002 p.279).

   Viewed from the position by Giddens the thesis's structure perspective both deals with what structures constrain and enable. The structure perspective is considered to be similar to what the thesis calls the vertical dimension. This dimension draws attention to the cross-border co-operation's power dependence upon the EU and the national governments and to the keenness of structural support which the co-operation is dependent upon.

   The vertical dimension is theoretical explained by ideal types. The ideal types are constructed in order to clarify; hallmarks of different cross-border co-operations, what a maintaining and deepening of the co-operation actually would mean, how power dependence upon the EU and the national states varies in relation to the ideal types, and consequently how the power of the nation-state can be differently affected depending on the structure of the co-operation. They are named as *issue network*, *policy network* and *policy community*, where issue network is a loosely integrated co-operation and policy community has the closest

integrated structure of cross-border co-operation. The method of ideal types is advantageous since it refines differences and can be seen as a guide which enables analysis (Halvorsen 1992 p.132). However, ideal types are just an analytical instrument and will not be viewed as definite and real categories (Bergström et al 2005 p.159).

The fact that the ideal types can be seen as categories along a continuum makes it easier to characterise co-operations and demonstrates how the power dependence varies from one ideal type to another. Strictly speaking, the ideal types facilitate an explanation of what kind of cross-border co-operation the South Baltic co-operation is at present and which structure it is embedded in. Subsequently it can through the ideal types be shown how and to what extent the EU and the national governments can influence and determine the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened.

Proceeding to the next chapter, the agency perspective, the "horizontal dimension" as it is called in this thesis suggests a framework of how to examine the links between the counterparts within the cross-border co-operation and how unified they are. A methodological problem that arises when applying a structural-agency perspective on a cross-border co-operation is the question of how to define the agency. In principal it could actually be the entire population within the cross-border co-operation. However, this would create a too wide research area and therefore the agency will consist of representatives at subnational level. The representatives are either a member of the cross-border co-operation's Steering Committee or Monitoring Committee, working in the cross border co-operation's Joint Technical Secretariat or is a former participant in the establishment process.

The agency will be examined from a similar agency-perspective defined by Hay, where the actors should have the ability or capacity to "act consciously, and in so doing, to attempt to realise his or her intentions" (Hay 2002 p.94). The ability and capacity is very essential for the subnational level in order to influence and determine its own co-operation's opportunity to be maintained and deepened. When the horizontal dimension is not strong enough it can be assumed that the co-operation's future is decided by the vertical dimension, consisting of the EU and the national governments. In order to study the cross-border co-operation's ability or capacity, it is presumed that the cross-border co-operation is dependent upon different factors. These factors are organised into three different themes; strategic unification and relation resources, knowledge and leadership resources, and mobilisation capacity, and is further explained in the chapter about the horizontal dimension.

The core in the structure-agency debate relates to what type of relationship structure and agency ought to have. One view is that agency and structure are oppositional. A second view presented by Giddens is that they are "flip sides of the same coin", indicating that we can alternate between the two but not view them simultaneously (ibid p.95, 120). The third and the most fruitful view for the purpose of the thesis is the one represented by the theorists Jessop (1996) and Hay (2002). Hay suggests that "the potential utility of seeking to combine the analysis of structure and agency and of recognising the complex interplay between the two in any given situation" (Hay 2002 p.101). Also Badersten remarks the interplay

where on the one hand the agent's intentions, motivation and variations in the degree of discretion play a key role but where on the other side the structure constitute the framework of the acting (Badersten 2002 p.78). In line with Hay, Jessop and Badersten cross-border co-operations are considered as a complex interplay between the structure (the EU and the national governments) and the agency (the subnational actors). Consequently, both the structure and the agency must be taken into account simultaneously in order to study which hands cross-border co-operations actually lies in.

2.3   Selection of Data and Interviewees

The theory employed for the second research question concerning the establishment process is to a greater part inspired by John W Kingdon and his revised model of how to understand decision-making processes in multi-level structures. In contrast; the developed analytical framework, related to the third research question concerning how different actors can influence and determine the cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be maintained or deepened, is based on different theoretical strands. The literature about cross-border co-operations cannot be seen as a composed theoretical approach, due to the many perspectives that exist. Therefore, it has been essential to select the approaches suitable for the thesis' research questions and also supplement with previous research from; policy analyses, organisational theory and democratic theories. Thus the theories are further considered in the subsequent chapters this section pays rather attention to the methodology considerations regarding the empirical work.

In order to answer the two operational questions the empirical work must have two viewpoints. Firstly, insight is required in how the establishment process proceeded and secondly it is necessary to have awareness of different actors' attitudes to the co-operation.

The first viewpoint was in part researchable through homepages, documents and minutes. However, it was necessary to obtain additional information from what Flick calls "expert interviews". The expert interviews are useful when insights are required in a certain field of activity, which the expert represents (Flick 2006 p.165). Moreover, these kinds of interviews generally require that the interviewer holds good pre-knowledge in the field (Kvale 1996 p.101), where perusal of; homepages, documents and minutes played a central role. When using the method of expert interviews, different interview objects contribute to different knowledge and there is hence no reason to ask the same questions to the interviewees (Esaiasson et al 2004 p.254). Different question batteries were therefore written to all interviewees.

To the second viewpoint about different actors' attitudes to the co-operation, respondent interviews were applied. Respondent interviews are characterised by the interviewees' thoughts being the object of study (Esaiasson et al 2004 p.254).) An advantage that follows is that both the expert interviews and the respondent interviews can be conducted in a semi-structured style. This made it possible to

combine them and conduct them at the same time, since several interviewees had a function as both an expert and as a respondent. The hallmark of semi-structured interviews is that they consist of a sequence of themes, as well as suggested questions. This contributes to an openness to follow up the answers given (Kvale 1996 p.124, Flick 2006 p.165)

The interview questions were based on the written theory and the developed analytical framework. Another reason for having different question batteries to different actors, except the reason that expert interviews require it, is derived from the fact that it is only the subnational actors who should have a say concerning the horizontal dimension. National actors and the representatives from the EU commission instead played a greater role when it came to understand the vertical dimension. Moreover, different actors have been involved at various times in the co-operation and they have or did have different functions. Some were involved in the establishment process and others knew more about present conditions. Consequently, all these reasons resulted in the need to have different questions battery, even if some questions could be used for all.

Most of the interviews took place in the interviewees' working places, where the interview objects probably felt most comfortable. Compared to telephone interviews, meeting the people involved in the co-operation hopefully resulted in a more trustful relationship, where the interviews felt freer to speak. The interviews were also conducted in the interviewees' native language (English, German or Swedish) apart from stakeholders from Poland, where poor polish language skills forced me to conduct the interviews in English.

So how were the interviewees selected? The process of choosing interview objects can be similar to the initial phase of the method of process-tracing. The first step in process-tracing is namely to identify actors who are relevant (Esaiasson et al 2004 p.142). This is often a detective work, where no simple method can be applied (Gerring 2007 p.172-185). Gerring's comment on that it is not always simple to find interview objects, turned out be true as it took a great deal of time to find the right interview objects. However, a combination of participant lists from different meetings since 2006, minutes and the so-called famous snowball effect, contributed to the selected interviewees.

Due to the aim of conducting both expert interviews and respondent interviews often in combination with each other, a special selection was vital. For the expert interviews, who mostly are related to the research question concerning the establishment process it was important that the interviewees had the unique information requested. In order to be an expert a good deal of experience is an initial requirement. Here it turned out that just three representatives have been involved in the co-operation since its beginning. It was therefore very crucial to interview these actors; Niels Cresten Andersen (Denmark), Ulf Savbäck (Sweden) and Slawomir Demkowicz – Dobrzanski (Poland). In addition, another expert who was important for the understanding was identified, Wiktor Szydarowski (the author of the Operational Programme). Carina Johnsson (Sweden), Håkan Brynelsson (Sweden), Karl Schmude (Germany) and Andreas Schubert (Germany) can also partly be seen as experts since they were involved in the co-operation from the beginning and took part in the establishment process. The head

of the Joint Technical Secretariat (Martha Plichta) responsible for the daily management of the co-operation was selected for a combination of an expert and respondent interview.

Two criteria constituted the selection of the respondent interviewees in order to examine both the vertical and horizontal dimension. Firstly, that they represented different political levels (the EU, the national governments and the subnations). Secondly, that they represented different countries. Due to time constraints it was not possible to visit all five countries; therefore most information was obtained from three countries, as well from representatives from the European Commission. Firstly, Poland was selected because they are responsible for the Managing Authority of the co-operation. Secondly, Sweden, since they took the initiative for the co-operation within the framework of Interreg. Finally, Germany was selected because of their early doubtfulness and their late decision to join the co-operation. However, the Danish view was given through Niels Christen Andersen via a telephone interview and Lithuania's view was obtained through E-Mail correspondence. Altogether, fourteen face to face interviews were carried out; three telephone interviews and one questionnaire. The interviews lasted 1.5 hour on average and all of them have been transcribed. A list of interviewees is attached in Appendix 1.

3 How to understand decision-making processes in multilevel-structures

To understand decision-making processes several theoretical approaches have in earlier research been applied. According to Kingdon, three approaches are more common than others; rational decision-making, incrementalism and the garbage can model. In order to shed light on the establishment process of the South Baltic co-operation and what role different actors played, the garbage can model carries more relevance.

A rational decision-making model often includes a top-down perspective where goals first are defined, then alternatives of solutions are compared and finally the best alternative at least cost is chosen. However, it is not always the reality that processes follow a regular pattern (Kingdon 2003 p.71, 78). A rational decision-making model is also very difficult to achieve when there are multiple actors (Hill 2002 p.44), which was the case during the establishment process of the South Baltic co-operation.

Even the approach of incrementalism is insufficient when intending to understand the South Baltic co-operation's establishment process. Incrementalism focuses on small gradual policy changes. It is therefore not applicable when new co-operations are established which do not follow from earlier decisions (Kingdon 2003 p.80). Consequently, the garbage can model remains important and will be presented here and partly adjusted in order to fit the phenomena under study.

3.1 The garbage can model

The garbage can model was originally developed by Michael D. Cohen, James March and Johan Olsen in 1972. However, new features have been added since then. Kingdon, one of the foremost in the debate has for example contributed with a revised model for a wider understanding of processes. His model that in addition to the term "garbage can" also includes the terms "policy windows" and "policy entrepreneurs" is the most suitable for the thesis's purpose and is therefore primarily used.

To understand a decision-making process, or like in this case to understand the establishment process of the South Baltic cross-border co-operation, it is according to the garbage can model essential to study policy streams and the so called mix of garbage. The policy streams within the garbage can consist of; problems, solutions, participants and participants' resources. These policy streams operate largely independent of one another. For example solutions are developed

whether or not there is a problem. People may also generate solutions due to self-interest, for instance in order to keep their job or to expand their unit. Furthermore, policy streams often come from different origins and may also suddenly change or develop after new situations facing the people involved in the decision-making process (ibid p.84-88). To use March and Olsen's words decision-making processes are often 'organized anarchies'. 'Collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work' (cited in ibid. p.85).

What later determines the outcome of a decision is how different policy streams are processed and joined. Who the participants are at a given time may for example matter. The outcome can dramatically be affected by who is invited or shows up for a meeting. Likewise, the solutions which are ready for airing and which problems are on people's minds are critical. In addition participant's resources may also play an essential role for the outcome.

In sum, a study of the process must consider two things. Firstly, the flow of separate policy streams through the system. Secondly, the coupling of the streams (Kingdon 2003 p.84-88). In the South Baltic case, it is possible to separate streams that came from the EU, national actors and from subnational actors. Consequently, when comparing the original streams with the real outcome it will be clear how different actors have influenced and determined the outcome.

3.2   Policy Windows

As indicated above, decisions are made when different policy streams (problems, solutions, participants and the participants' resources) are coupling. For example a problem is recognised, a solution is developed and available, and the political climate allows a change. But how and when do the policy streams come together?

According to Kingdon, the policy streams are joining most likely at critical times when a window opens and presents the opportunity for a launch. A window opens and closes for a variety of reasons. It can for instance open when a public opinion wants a change, when a new legislation comes to force or simply when an administration is changed (Kingdon 2003 p.168). Another reason that policy windows open can be due to a spillover effect. The fact that a window open for one subject can often increase the probability that a window will open for another similar subject. Politicians or civil servants may for example see an attractive agreement in one adjacent issue area and then attempt to transfer the same agreement into similar situations (ibid p.190-192). In the same way a window also closes for a couple reasons. For instance, it happens when participants already have addressed solutions and still fail to act. People may then be unwilling to invest further time, energy or political capital. Furthermore, the event or reason that made the window open may also pass from the scene (ibid p.169).

Consequently, a window may not be open for a very long time and can close quite suddenly. If the right policy streams do not come together and if the

participants do not take advantage of the opportunity that is served at the critical time when the window is open, they must wait until the next opportunity arise. Due to this, one could understand that quick action is required. Proposal that have been worked out beforehand have a better chance to be breezed through, even if a new proposal may also rise to the surface and be equally suitable. Kingdon notes that; since participants know that the window soon will be closed really big steps are often taken very quickly or not at all. This creates a tendency of people having second thoughts about policies that are launched since they often are rushed in order to not let opportunities pass (ibid p.170).

3.3   Policy Entrepreneurs

Up to this point it has been argued that the outcome of a decision depends upon when the policy streams are coupling and mutually when a policy window opens. It has also been noted that policy streams that already have started to couple before the window opens easier leads to a final decision, even though strong single factors may change the track after the window has opened. What has not been explained so far is; what makes the coupling of the policy streams, both before as well as after the window has opens?

When the window is open opportunities for change increase but someone must actively couple the policy streams. There must be some who are willing to invest their resources in terms of time, energy, reputation and money in order to push through a decision. These people that have the willingness to invest their resources and the belief that the issue are going to be productive are by Kingdon called policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs must not necessarily be the origin of the idea; rather they are the ones that push so an idea becomes the final decision. Ideas do often have several origins and the most important is hence not to understand were they come from but who and what made them take hold and grow (Kingdon 2003 p.72, 179).

Policy entrepreneurs are the ones that soften up the systems and enable the coupling of the policy streams. However, to do so some qualities are required for success. Firstly, the policy entrepreneurs must have a wide expertise. That is to say, he or she must have knowledge about the special conditions, an ability to speak for others and have good negotiations skills. Secondly, the person must also have some form of political connection. A higher authoritative decision-making position creates much more influence. Finally, the quality that probably is most crucial is persistence but evidently in combination with the other qualities mentioned. Persistence implies, as also already mentioned a willingness to sometimes invest remarkable quantities of time, energy and other resources (ibid p.179-180).

One can nearly always pinpoint policy entrepreneurs or key persons in a decision-making process. The establishment process of the South Baltic co-operation is probably no exception. However, most interesting is to examine which level this or those key persons represent: the EU, the nation states or the

subnations as there would be a considerable difference depending on who is the driving force.

According to several earlier case studies (see for example Perkmann 1999, Church & Reid 1999, Beck 1997) it has been found that when subnational actors have been the driving force, cross-border co-operation can jointly work more independently from the central authorities, implement their political goals and in some sense also challenge and undermine the power of the nation-state. Higher success is also expected in cases where local authorities and regions tend to be the driving force and where the policy entrepreneurs represent the subnational level. They often then see cross-border co-operation as a part of a strategy as "entrepreneurial regions/cities".

In contrast, when it turns out that actors from the national governments have been the driving force, the cross-border co-operation mostly cannot be seen as it hollows out the nation-state. The cross-border co-operation may then in a higher degree depend on national states politics. They may be employed in the context of more general policy objectives, which means that the cross-border co-operation's discretion to a large extent lies in the hands of the central authorities (Perkmann 1999 p.662-663).

4   The vertical dimension

In order to shed light on a cross-border co-operation and be able to identify different actors' influence of the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained or deepened; it is initially central to understand the multilevel structure that the co-operation is embedded in. In this chapter a vertical dimension will be discussed, which contextualises the cross-border co-operations' relations with the EU and the different participating states. Through the creation of ideal types this relationship can be conceptualised and constitute a framework of how to understand cross-boarder co-operations' power dependence. It is essential to understand the power dependence in order to examine the influence of the EU and the national governments and what discretion subnational actors have for maintaining or deepening their co-operation (Östhol 1996 p.32). The degree of influence from the EU and the participating states can accordingly affect a strengthening or undermining of the nation-state. If a cross-border co-operation is highly dependent on the national level and national states control the cross-border co-operation the co-operation will most likely not undermine the nation-state.

After the vertical structure is described, it is from given circumstances possible to study cross-border co-operations' opportunities to be maintained or deepened from an agency related aspect. This means that this chapter sets out the structure cross-border co-operations act in, so the next chapter through a horizontal dimension can focus on the links between the counterparts within a cross-border co-operation and what capacity they themselves have to maintain or deepen their co-operation.

4.1   Ideal types and power dependence

Ideal types have in different constructions frequently been composed and applied in research related to cross-border co-operations (see for example Jørgensen 1998, Hall et al 2005 and Jordan 2006). The three ideal types constructed for this thesis's purpose should like previous research not be seen as definitive categories. Rather they will work as a tool; to clarify different forms of cross-border co-operations, to understand how power dependence upon the EU and the national states vary depending on the co-operation form and consequently how the power of the national governments can be differently affected. The ideal types are also useful in demonstrating what factors are required for the co-operation either to be maintained or deepened.

The three constructed ideal types for this thesis are entitled, *issue network, policy network* and *policy community*, and can after inspiration from Jørgensen

(1998) and Rhodes (1997) be seen as categories along a continuum. The issue network is the most loose co-operation form and the policy community has the tightest integrated structure of cross-border co-operation.

The ideal types and the different degree of power dependence for each ideal type are also illustrated in a figure on page 19.

4.1.1 Issue network

The first ideal type, issue network, has a hallmark of a fluctuating membership which is open to all potential partners across the borders (Jørgensen 1998 p.29-30). Due to its open membership character there is no clear territorial delimitation (Hall et al 2005 p.76-79). Also, because of its open membership, contacts and continuity will vary in frequency and intensity. The co-operation is mostly on an informal basis and has no generally established common agenda of interests and visions. Rather issue network is driven from subject and takes place in different times (Rhodes 1997 p.44, Jordan 2006 p.24).

This type of co-operation is beyond any forms of institutionalisation, and is therefore merely dependent on individual actors or groups in the society that search for partners and build networks across the borders (Paasi 1986 p.34-35). Due to the issue network's low degree of institutionalisation, a support from the EU and the national states do not determine its existence. The issue network constructed here as an ideal type is not financial sponsored from either the EU or the national states. The effect of this is that the co-operation is not subject to any hierarchical regulation or obligations to the central governments. Additionally, because of its loosely integrated co-operational structure it is not contingent upon any organisational resources, which constitute the daily management of cross-border activities (Jørgensen 1998 p.29-34). The low degree of power dependence upon the EU and the national governments also implies that no reinforcement for the specific co-operation is required.

Nevertheless, a low degree of power dependence on the EU and the national states does not obviously result in more operational discretion. The fact that issue networks are not sponsored with any external financial recourses constrain the cross-border co-operation's opportunities to deepen their integration. This is particularly noticeable for cross-border co-operations which represent entities from different countries with diverged prosperities and where some in the network have resources and others do not (ibid p.29). This principally implies complications in the search of common co-operation areas and projects that bring mutual advantages. Consequently, issue networks are often restricted to merely exchange information and knowledge, and where pooling resources are less common. However, exchanges of information and knowledge have several advantages for both developed and undeveloped economies. An example can be given from the environmental field. Many regional undeveloped economies have for instance not developed a domestic "eco-industry", and contacts with developed regions can therefore generate a wider engagement into environmental protection. At the same time the developed regions can strengthen their eco-

industry and make economical profits. Further activities that can be held in the form of issue networks are when people co-operate and work through common power across the borders. They may for example have the purpose of influencing and pressurising the different national governments to take responsibility for acting and finding solutions for a problem that has been identified in the region (Baker 1996 p.27-31). Finally, due to the loose form of co-operation and since the activities mostly consist of exchanging information and knowledge the power of the national governments could barely be affected.

4.1.2 Policy network

As demonstrated above, issue networks are not contingent upon an array of factors, besides engaged individual actors who initiate the co-operation. Issue networks have therefore been considered as the first stage in a co-operation process and numerous problems are often not surfaced during this phase (Haveri 2008 p.149). In the next step, named policy network, more compromises are required, which later will be deeper clarified in the discussion regarding the horizontal dimension. Also an increased power dependence upon the EU and the national states emerge within a policy network compared to an issue network. This relationship is in discussed this section, in terms of how the participation from the EU and the national states both enables and constraints the policy network.

The policy network is characterised by a more limited membership and a clearer territorial delimitation compared to an issue network. Furthermore, a policy network is deeper formalised and contacts and interactions take place on a regular basis. Its visions for the co-operation are constricted and contracted to some agreed policy areas (Jørgensen 1998 p.29-30). Most policy networks have a long-term co-operation aim even if their stability is contingent upon several factors (Östhol 1996 p.38).

A policy network across borders is often an outcome of complex interaction between the EU, the national states and the population within the cross-border region (O'Dowd 2002 p.112). This implies another sense of power dependence upon the EU and national states than what for example was the case with issue networks. The power dependence within a policy network lies mutually on a financial, decisional and legal bias.

To begin with, the financial support which policy networks receive from either the EU or the national governments provide opportunities to deepen their co-operation from mainly ceremonial interaction towards realisation of concrete projects (Perkmann 1999 p.662). The financial resources also enable an establishment of a co-ordinated organisation, which are responsible for the daily management of cross-border activities. The staff in these Joint Secretariats, can in another sense match counter partners, and with special skills supply the counter partners with advice for successful integration (Jørgensen 1998 p.34). The external financial resources do also give birth to realise projects that do not result in actual mutual advantages between the counter partners, so far as they do not

bring any disadvantages for some of the stakeholders. The mutual dependence between the counter parts can therefore be described as common aspiration for external resources albeit they are allocated unequally (Östhol 1996 p.39).

Even if, the financial resources bring opportunities they also constrains the discretion. Due to many actors involvement in the co-operation, the process of defining the agenda needs to consider many preferences, which often are not compatible (ibid p.38). Subnational actors have no decisive power, which implies that it is only possible to co-operate in issues that are approved by the EU and the national parliaments (Hall et al 2005 p.72). Another problem, caused by the involvement of several political levels is that the co-operation needs to follow all countries legislations which sometimes are fundamentally different and in substantial contradiction to each other. In addition they must also follow the EU's regulations written specific for cross-border co-operation. This furthermore can result in constrains for important common projects and actions (Jørgensen 1998 p.32)

At last, what are then the key activities for a policy network? As mentioned previously, a policy network brings possibilities to realise different kinds of concrete projects. When resources are shifted from national level to regional level, projects can be designed for those who have the insight in the regions need. On the other hand, projects can also contribute to essential solutions and improvement that are valuable for the national states as a whole. The financial support may further enable undeveloped regions, which find themselves with administrative incapacities, in terms of untrained staff, missing knowledge and facilities, possibilities in the form of assistance from more developed countries. Consequently, this could for example in the environmental field mean that some countries have useful skills or data collection, which can help others to fully implement the EU's environmental protection policy (Barker 1996 p.28-31). However, policy networks have not the possibility to implement any policies, since they are not an executive authority (Hall et al 2005 p.72). This in combination with national actors' involvement implies that the power of the nation-state can just marginally be affected.

4.1.3 Policy community

The policy community is the closest form of co-operation and the only co-operation structure that really can undermine the power of the national governments within the co-operation area. A policy community is territorially delimited with restricted membership, and its common interest and value-system, is not only limited to specific policy areas. Interaction takes place frequently, and in comparison to policy network all members are always involved in decision-making processes, including defining the agenda. The most explicit difference compared to the policy network is that all members have their own resources, which give less or at least another form of power dependent upon the EU and the national governments (Rhodes 1997 p.43-44). The financial resources can be imposed by taxes on their citizens earmarked for cross-border activities. However,

it can be very difficult to set aside resources due to the central regulations the cross-border co-operation needs to follow. Although, policy communities are characterised by that they receive financial resources but have less detailed regulations about how to use them (Jørgensen 1998 p.32-33).

The cross-border co-operation's organisation is not merely made up of a consulting and coordinated art; it also has the power to make priorities and decisions and furthermore execute either its or national politics (Hall et al 2005 p.76-79). Legally, the cross-border co-operation has a constitutional framework which to a different extent regulates the co-operation and gives it the necessary competence to carry out common tasks (Jørgensen 1998 p.34).

Accordingly, policy community has more autonomy and is in some sense less dependent on the EU and national governments. However, this level of co-operation is very difficult to reach from both the vertical but also from the horizontal point of view. Firstly a policy community implies that the cross-border region is heavily united and that all criteria outlined in the chapter about the horizontal dimension are met. Secondly, the national governments must be willing to give up some power to the regional level, which they are not always too enthusiastic about. Experience shows that in many cases where subnations have tried to exert more autonomy from their national states their attempts have mostly failed, or their success is due to a very strong engagement from the subnational level in order to be a policy community.

Despite the difference to establish a policy community it can be argued that this ideal type is the most advantageous since it brings the cross-border co-operation more opportunity to deal with local issues. By contrast to policy networks; policy community can in addition to realising projects also create common policies and implement them, which according to Marshall have a higher value than single developmental projects funded by the EU (Marshall 1997 p.195).

Figure 4.1 Hallmarks of the ideal types and the vertical dimension

	Hallmarks	Vertical dimension — Power dependence upon the EU and the national states
Issue Network	*Membership:* fluctuating *Co-operation area:* no territorial delimitation *Interaction:* contacts and continuity will vary in frequency and intensity. *Interest:* no general established common agenda of interests and visions. *Permanence:* no *Kind of activities:* exchange information and knowledge	*Financial resources:* Not for projects or for a co-ordinated organisation *Operational discretion:* No obligations to the central governments, but the absence of external financial resources constrain the cross-border co-operation's operational discretion *Legal dependence:* must follow the national laws in all countries but are not subject to any hierarchical regulation *Affect on the power of the nation-state:* barely affected
Policy Network	*Membership:* more limited *Co-operation area:* clearer territorial delimitation *Interaction:* regular basis *Interest:* constricted and contracted to some agreed policy areas *Permanence:* long-term co-operation aim *Kind of activities:* realisation of concrete projects	*Financial resources:* to realisation of concrete projects and to the co-ordinated organisation. *Operational discretion:* constricted due to the interaction with the EU and the national states *Legal dependence:* need to follow all countries legislations and the regulations for the co-operation *Affect on the power of the nation-state:* marginally affected
Policy Community	*Membership:* restricted *Co-operation area:* territorially delimited *Interaction:* frequently *Interest:* common interest and value-system in all issue areas *Permanence:* long-term co-operation aim *Kind of activities:* establish and implement common policies	*Financial resources:* all members have their own resources *Operational discretion:* has its own power to make priorities and take decisions and furthermore execute either its or national politics *Legal dependence:* has its own constitutional framework *Affect on the power of the nation-state:* affected

Figure 5.1 The horizontal dimension

	Horizontal dimension		
	Strategic unification and relation resources	**Knowledge resources and leadership**	**Mobilisation**
Issue Network	*Technical factors*: no need for an appropriate size of the population and geography and no high level of economic exchange is required *Shared vision*: is to prefer *Common identity*: not required *Cultural and institutional similarities*: not required *Understanding and mutual trust*: is to prefer	*Knowledge resources*: at least have access to available information *Leadership resources*: no leadership is required	*Politician's support*: no *Officers' enthusiasm*: some *Public support*: no
Policy Network	*Technical factors*: an appropriate size of the population and geography is preferred as well as adequate level of economic exchange *Shared vision*: required *Common identity*: not required *Cultural and institutional similarities*: is to prefer, but not necessary *Understanding and mutual trust*: required	*Knowledge resources*: access to available information and opportunities to absorb new ideas and learn from each other *Leadership resources*: a leadership from either the EU or the nations is acceptable but preferably a leadership at subnational level	*Politician's support*: yes *Officers' enthusiasm*: yes *Public support*: partly
Policy Community	*Technical factors*: an appropriate size of the population and geography is required as well as a high level of economic exchange *Shared vision*: required *Common identity*: is to prefer *Cultural and institutional similarities*: required *Understanding and mutual trust*: required	*Knowledge resources*: access to available information, opportunities to mutually absorb new ideas and learn from each other and knowledge should with prefer have different origins. *Leadership resources*: Leadership from a coordinated organisation or from key persons at subnational level	*Politician's support*: yes *Officers' enthusiasm*: yes *Public support*: yes

5 The horizontal dimension

The vertical dimension outlined the structure which cross-border co-operations are embedded in, but cross-border co-operations are not only a top-down project, regulated from the EU and the national governments. In order to function effectively and for durable success there also needs to be a bottom-up involvement, where the co-operation actually is promoted by subnational actors (Baker 1997 p.23). In this chapter focus will be on the agency, which in this case is equal to subnational actors within the co-operation. The chapter seeks to outline a framework of how to evaluate the South Baltic programme's opportunities for maintaining and deepening from an agency perspective.

The factors that a cross-border co-operation on a horizontal level are dependent on is among others inspired by Healey et al (2003) and will be presented from three different themes. The themes are entitled; strategic unification and relation resources, knowledge and leadership resources, and mobilisation capacity. The framework below is also illustrated on page 20.

5.1 Strategic unification and relation resources

Crucial for a cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be maintained or deepened is that actors can see some kind of advantages with the co-operation, that is to say; recognise strategic reasons for unification, and feel some form of belonging. An issue network can survive without a strong feeling of belonging whereas a policy community would probably not be possible to be maintained without this feeling.

To begin with, there are some technical factors that can contribute to the feeling of belonging. An appropriate size of the population is the first technical factor, meaning that if there are many participants the cost of information exchange and of monitoring are consequently going to be higher. Furthermore, the larger and more varied the population, the greater is the likelihood for value differences, which can constrain the co-operation and the feeling of belonging (Jordan 2006 p.36). Another technical factor includes the natural properties of the cross-border region. A geographical region such as a common river basin may offer an area for economic and social planning, which can enhance the strategic unification (Jørgensen 1998 p.24). Due to an issue network has a fluctuating membership and no territorial delimitation these two first factors are only valid for a policy network and a policy community. An additional requirement, which also in some sense can be regarded as technical is the economies of scale. This approach is associated with the tradition of neoclassical economics, and captures

economic transaction, commuting, shopping and other economic linkages. If the cross-border co-operation bears presently and historically tighter economical relations, a deeper co-operation in form of a policy community is more likely to expand (Perkmann et al 2002 p.7-8). If economic exchange to a high degree is absent, this can consequently operate as a barrier for a successful closer co-operation (Lersche et al 2002 p.77). The economies of scale are although very difficult to evaluate since it would require correct measurement of output, which should contain both qualitative and quantitative indicators. However, the economies of scale are not determined for durable co-operation. There can also be other reasons for maintaining a co-operation, where for instance environmental protection can constitute one example.

Most importantly, to maintain and deepen all kind of co-operations' structure is that the subnational actors act as a unit and that they have a shared vision of guidelines for action and intervention (Perkmann 2007 p.262). This often includes a common interest, a shared problem and an inclination to work towards common solutions (Scott 1999 p.607, Healey et al 2003 p.77). The greater the sizes of problems or potential benefits, the more interested are actors often to work towards solutions (Jessop 2002 p.39). The thinkable difficulties that can arise within a cross-border co-operation would be if participants own territorial interests that would determine the outcome rather than if representatives would act in the common interest of the cross-border co-operation (Hall et all 2005 p.135, Perkmann 2002 p.109). To avoid the problem of too self-centred actors it is essential that all partners can draw benefits but also make concessions (Johansson 2002 p.12). In addition, if there is a lack of common visions and interests the co-operation tends to be of ad-hoc character. Many of these cross-border co-operations with no initial defined ambitions are often later questioned by increasing doubts regarding their effectiveness and if they contribute to any improvements (Perkmann 2002 p.109).

Furthermore, a wide range of researchers of cross-border co-operation have stressed a common identity as a central factor for durable co-operation across the borders. Nevertheless, there are authors that argue that a common identity is not necessary in order to establish good co-operation. For instance it has been claimed that modern societies have become culturally more complex and that problem solving requires co-operation between different groups that do not necessarily share the same language (Hajer 2003 p.10). Furthermore it has been claimed that we nowadays have a lower degree of shared identity with our compatriots and less stable local units than we once did (Innes et al 2003 p. 35). Deriving from this, in compliance with relatively unified researchers and from the ideal types, a common identity can not be seen as a requirement for maintaining a policy network. However, a policy community with a tighter co-operation structure a more common identity it to prefer but not required.

As indicated, an achievement of a common identity is an ambitious target. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to build identities across borders even if it is difficult and takes time. Identities are namely multiplied, which means that people can have more than one identity and they are also changeable. National borders can be seen as socially constructed where neither relations nor identities are static

(Stubbergaard 2007 p.250). It has been stated that construction of the meaning of communities and their boundaries occurs through narratives. Stories give people common experiences, history and memories binds people together. Even culture, politics, economics, administration and education can constitute narratives which the new established cross-border co-operations that want a common identity must consider. Furthermore, identities are often described in terms of a difference between us and the others, rather than focus on the certain group of people (Paasi 2002 p.75-81).

Another important horizontal factor for a sustainable co-operation is cultural and institutional similarities. Since policy networks and also policy communities in most cases do not have any instrumental character, featured of a hierarchical system; they are even more contingent on institutional attributes. Institutional attributes are however evolving only as the co-operation has been in process for a while. It has then become a value-bearing organisation with its own identity and has its own view of what the essential problems are and which solution they require (Christensen et al 2005 p.13-16). As mentioned it takes time to reach an institutional level, and in fact many cross-border co-operations never turn out to be institutionalised (Hall et al 2005 p.72). However, the starting situation is very essential. If the countries involved compose a too wide institutional diversity and no shared vision, the cross-border co-operation will probably to a higher degree confront problems with efficiency and collective responsibility-taking. Furthermore, predominated cultural differences can also result in misunderstanding and frictions in the co-operation (Jerneck 2007 p.227). It is also claimed that co-operations that consist of a homogenous group may actually co-ordinate themselves better than a heterogeneous group (Jordan 2006 p37). Consequently, since cross-border co-operations mostly have no instrumental character, some kind of institutional similarities are not only good but also desirable. However, during the development of institutional attributes and a common identity the cross-border co-operation is encouraged to utilize the institutional and cultural heterogeneousness. By doing so, the heterogeneousness can in some sense contribute to a higher degree of flexibility, increased competence and skills to handle a complexity of diverse considerations (Christensen et al 2005 p.59).

In sum, a common identity, cultural and institutional similarities are important even if is arguable to which extent. However, an understanding between all of the participants as well as a mutual trust is something that always is essential for an issue network as well as a policy community. The origins of trust can arise from a variety of things. Common values can play a vital role but also past strategies imply mutual trust. Past strategies in terms of earlier experience of co-operations and the feedback from previous choices, may result in trust and a durable co-operation (Jordan 2006 p.16, 37). Even the numbers of relations which already exist and are linked across the borders, also referred as "the thickness or integration of network", have a high significance for understanding and trust. The relation resources and the mutual trust are furthermore often personalised, which means that there often are some important key persons in a cross-border co-operation. These relations between the key persons across the borders have an

extensive impact of the co-operation climate as a whole. For instance, it is important that there is an absence of complaining about the behaviour of particular participants and the authorities involved in the cross-border co-operation. A shift of people in leading positions can also jeopardize the networks and the co-operation's duration, since networks often rely on personalised trust. When people often are exchanged a co-operation's long-term development goals can be treated (Healey et al 2003 p.75-78).

5.2   Common knowledge resources and leadership

As indicated above a shared vision and interest are essential for a cross-border co-operation. This shared vision is often derived from a coherent view and from common sources about "the place and its problems", which can be called common knowledge resources (Healey et al 2003 p.79). In order to maintain a cross-border co-operation a capital of common knowledge resources is necessary, which consist of an array of explicit, tacit, systemised and experimental knowledge. When different stakeholders have diverse frames of references, when they focus their analysis and understanding on different issues and have competing priorities there is consequently per definition a lack of common knowledge resources. This lack of common knowledge is of course most serious if the co-operation is structured as a policy community but even an issue network may gain to have an adequate level of common knowledge resources. A sufficient capital of common knowledge resources primarily captures three criteria. Issue network should at least fulfil the first criterion listed below, a policy network at least the first and the second criteria and a policy community should meet all criteria.

The first criterion consists of an openness which means that all participants should have access to available information about problems and solutions (ibid. p.65, 79-80). A second criterion of knowledge resources is that within the co-operation it should be possible to absorb new ideas and learn from each other. If a co-operation promotes a learning experience, the actors will achieve the ability to develop a wider perspective and use viewpoints they have never used before, which will lead to a stronger and more successful cross-border co-operation. In order to learn, it is important that the decision-making process is not only top-down controlled. For instance it is vital that the participants do not feel that a core of members have set the agenda in advance (ibid. p.80). The third criterion for a high extent of knowledge resources, relates to the second, and implies that knowledge is better accepted and applicable if it has different origins and when counter-parts have similar skills and provide knowledge of analogues manner (Jerneck 2007 p.231-232).

In order to maximise the utilisation of the knowledge resources some form of leadership is beneficial at least for a policy network and a policy community. As previous noted cross-border co-operations are not of an instrumental character with a traditional hierarchical system and must therefore rely on informal leadership. The informal leadership can have different approaches and be

diversely exercised (Christensen et al 2005 p.65). However, it could be expected that in a tighter form of co-operation the co-ordinated organisation in the cross-border co-operation should perform some form of leadership, rather than the actors at national level. Likewise, a tighter co-operation should also have individual key persons at subnational level that can perform the leadership. Through the knowledge resources which the leader has access to, the leader can specify the direction of the co-operation, keep the co-operation on track, act in finding compromises and mobilise power. Furthermore, it has also been argued that a subnational leadership within a cross-border co-operation in some sense should challenge and problematise the concept of the national state (Jerneck 2007 p.236).

Another perspective regarding leadership is that it neither has to be performed from the co-ordinated organisation nor by individual key persons within the cross-border region. Rather it is argued that the European Commission plays an essential role in being the leader, accompanied with that both countries and regions often are too unsure about their own preferences and lack the capacity to find mutually acceptable agreements (Moravcsik 1999 p.269-270 and Beach 2004 p.410-412). In a policy network with less independency this could be the accepted, but in a policy community it can be required that the cross-border co-operation should manage its own leadership.

5.3 Mobilisation capacity

Related to the previously presented themes, mobilisation capacity from below also play an important role for subnational actor's opportunities to maintain and deepen their co-operation. Particularly important would this be if it is shown that the EU-commission or the national states have the required leadership. Without an internal mobilisation capacity the maintaining and deepening of the co-operation will heavily depend on the EU's ambitions or the national states' politics. The term mobilisation capacity refers to three forms of mobilisations; politicians' support, officers' enthusiasm and public support.

Politicians' support is acknowledged to underpin the cross-border co-operation's opportunities to maintain over time (Perkmann 2007 p.257-258). Particularly important are the politician's support for a policy network or a policy community since these principally must be recognised and approved by local politicians. A policy community that to a higher extent decide on its own public resources must also arguably consider democratic representation where it is possible to define the ones who are responsible (Hall et all 2005 p.74-75). If there is no democratic representation politician's support is assumed to be lower, since the politicians then have less control. In contrast, another perspective claims that we are in a democratic paradigm between an old model of democratic representation and a new model of multi-level democracy. This implies that cross-border co-operations do not have to claim their legitimacy through democratic representation. Rather cross-border co-operation's political mobilisation and

political support derives from the ability to handle social conflicts. Viewed from this perspective the capacity to make quick decisions is ranked as more important, than other competitive values as democracy (Jerneck et al 2001 p.16, Jerneck 2007 p.243). To conclude the discussion about political representation contra the ability to efficiently handle conflicts and make decisions, this thesis does not seek to take position in the debate. Rather, both political representation and the ability to efficiently handle problems will be considered as important values of mobilisation capacity and for subnational actors' opportunity to maintain and deepen their co-operation. However, how efficient problems are handled should and cannot in the framework of this thesis be evaluated, therefore the main focus will be to the extent politicians are involved and political representation.

Secondly, officers' enthusiasm is probably most essential in terms of mobilisation capacity. Politicians' support is crucial but it is often the civil servants in the case of a policy network and a policy community that execute the work and the ones involved in the cross-border co-operation. Their interest and enthusiasm determine the cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened. Furthermore, officers' enthusiasm depends on an array of issues. Preferably mobilisation among the civil servants at subnational level is built from below and not in a top-down manner. A top-down manner often entails a lack of participatory processes at subnational level. The stakeholders which then did not take part often see themselves as co-opted into the structure, where their possibilities to influence are limited. Consequently there can be a too wide gap between those who formed the co-operation and funded it and those who have to set up the programme and are responsible for the daily management. In some of the worst cases a mobilisation in opposition against the co-operation can take place or at least critical agents that have not had their say in the initial part can act as brokers for the co-operation (Healey et al 2003 p.82).

Finally, public support is also essential in terms of mobilisation capacity. However the criterion of public support varies depending on the co-operation's structure. Thus the public opinion may sometimes be very powerful; an issue network only requires the public not to constrain the co-operation. Mostly in a policy network and definitely in a policy community, where politicians have a say and public money are spent, the public opinion must be even more considered. For a policy network and a policy community, public support also captures an interest to participate in projects. It is when people participate in projects or even in the policy making that they start to deliberate and become politically active (Hajer 2003 p.89). This public involvement at subnational level may be very essential when it comes to internal mobilization capacity.

6 The establishment process of the South Baltic co-operation

This chapter considers the establishment process of the South Baltic co-operation from the perspective outlined in the first theoretical chapter. This and the subsequent chapters are predominately based on the material obtained from the conducted interviews. In order to make the text easy to read and refer to in an appropriate way different abbreviations are employed.

Representatives from the European Commission are abbreviated *EU* and the representative from the Joint Technical Secretariat has the acronym *JTS*. Likewise, the author of the cross-border co-operation's programme is simply named *AUTHOR*. National actors' and subnational actors' abbreviations start with an *N* respectively *SN*. After these letters a county code describes the actors' nationality (i.e. DK, GER, LIT, PL and SWE). To illustrate, a subnational actor from Denmark would than be referred as SN.DK. A list of interviewees' names and the pertained abbreviations is attached in Appendix 1.

6.1 The garbage can model – different policy streams within and across the South Baltic

Co-operations on local, regional and national level grew rapidly in the Baltic See area after the Cold War and also due to the European Union enlargements. There are nowadays as many co-operations in Baltic See area that most interviewees see no possibility to actually know them all. However the most foremost are: *HELCOM (Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission), BSPC (Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference), CPMR (Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe), UBC (Union ofthe Baltic Cities), BCCA (Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association), BARDI (Baltic Alliance of Regional Development Institutions), BSSSC (Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation), VASAB 2010 (Visions and Strategies around the Baltic Sea), Baltic 21 (An Agenda 21 for the Baltic Sea Region), CBSS (Council of the Baltic Sea States) and NCM (Nordic Council of Ministers)* (South Baltic Cross-border Co-operation Programme, 2007).

Even though the members of the South Baltic co-operation mostly are represented in the above mentioned co-operations these co-operations are not particularly aimed for the South Baltic area and do not have a cross-border perspective. There are rather two other co-operations that in this case deserve more attention; *Euroregion Baltic* and *Euroregion Pomerania*. The Euroregions

were established in the mid-nineties in order to facilitate the accession of Poland into the European Union (SN.DK). They both have different strategies of how to co-operate. Euroregion Baltic, which embraces regions of Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden, is the one that has been most visible and active (JTS). In addition, they have since 2006 their own Joint Development programme named Seagull. Seagull contains a development strategy for the next 10 years and an action programme prioritising a number of activities within the four focus areas of the strategy (SN.EUBAL). The idea behind this programme was that it one day would became an Interreg programme, funded by the EU (SN.SWE2). The Euroregion Pomerania has in comparison not been as visible; even if they also have their own agenda on what they consider as most important regarding collaboration (JTS, SN.EURPOM). The Euroregion Pomerania extends over the Northwest of Poland, the South of Sweden and the Northeast of Germany (www.pomerania.net, 09.08.01)

When applying the garbage can model, it can be interpreted as the Euroregion Baltic's development programme; Seagull was something that was already in the garbage can. It was waiting for the right opportunity to join other policy streams, for example resources. However, Seagull was not the single solution that needed resources. Different regions within the South Baltic area preferred a diverse range of co-operation structures. For example, Skåne, the south region in Sweden has for many years been a member of the co-operation Öresund, together with regions in Denmark and had a strong interest that it should continue (SN.SWE1). In some north German parts there also existed Interreg programme, with Denmark in northeast and Poland in west. The national representatives were very keen to keep these co-operations (N.GER2). Yet, Rostock in north Germany was quite disappointed with the situation since they were not included in any cross-border co-operations funding by Interreg at all (SN.GER). Consequently, Rostock's vision was another policy stream that waited for change.

Likewise, actors in Poland did not have the same opinions about co-operation structures. The west parts were only interested in co-operating with Germany. Several regions, also members of the Euroregion Baltic, did prefer the idea suggested by Euroregion Baltic of whom to co-operate with. Although, Gdansk which also is a member of the Euroregion Baltic had their own agenda on how they want to co-operate (SN.EURBAL). Gdansk was at a first point not interested to involve Germany and Lithuania in a co-operation. This was based on a survey conducted by the city of Gdansk of which regions that would be most attractive to co-operate with (SN.PL). Finally, even Lithuania did already have deep-rooted co-operation with the Baltic States and Russia which they prioritised (EU.1).

To sum up the situation; before the South Baltic co-operation became reality, there were a diverse range of ideas of how to co-operate. This can be illustrated with a garbage can with a flow of different policy streams still waiting to be processed and joined.

6.2 Policy windows opened the opportunity for the South Baltic cross-border co-operation

In the European Union's previous Cohesion period 2000-06 Interreg funding was not one of the main priorities. For the new period 2007-13, the Commission decided to change its regulations and European territorial co-operation became one of the three main pillars in the EU's Cohesion policy (*Cohesion policy 2007-13 – Commentaries and official texts,* January 2007 p.10). The new regulation implied that the Commission wanted all regions at the borders within the EU to participate in a cross-border co-operation. They also made clear that they did not want to have too many small programmes. The new regulation further allows cross-border co-operations crossing land-sea borders if the distance is not more than 150 kilometres. A so called policy window had opened for establishing new cross-border co-operations within the framework of Interreg.

After the regulations were changed the Commission contacted the national governments which had regions that bordered other European regions, in order to discuss how new cross border co-operations could be established. The reason that they contacted the national governments was that they should have the responsibility and also finance a bigger part of the Interreg programmes. Consequently, the years before 2007 a process was started and new cross-border co-operations were formed all over Europe. In the Baltic Sea the Central Baltic programme was established and also all borders in north were included in different Interreg programmes. In the South Baltic area different discussions took place, but the 150 kilometres rule limited the possibilities to establish one or even two cross-border co-operations. For example, the distance between Poland and Sweden is longer than 150 kilometres. However, several actors thought that they through lobbying could make EU compromise on the 150 kilometres rule. They knew that the EU reinforced co-operations and that EU did not want to exclude any parts within the EU (EU2, N.SWE, SN.DK). One interviewee also mentioned the South Baltic case as a spill-over effect. All other co-operations were already set in the Baltic Sea area and South Baltic was what was left and could therefore benefit of a so called spillover effect (N.SWE).

Although, the South Baltic was still too controversial, as too many of the EU's rules had to be broken. In the early spring of 2006, any formal meeting between the actors in the South Baltic area had still not been held. At this point most actors knew that the so called policy window was at that time partly open and would only be open a short time before it would close. If they did not take advantage of the opportunity, they would have to wait for the next cohesion period 2013-19. Consequently, they needed a quick deal in order to agree on how the co-operation should be framed, which included writing the cross-border co-operation programme and submitting a final version to the national governments in November 2006 and one to the Commission before December 2006 (Minutes, Gdansk 23.08.2006, Minutes, Karlskrona 02.11.2006)).

To sum up the situation, the EU had through a new regulation opened a policy window and created an opportunity for cross-border co-operation programmes to be approved and financed. Nevertheless the policy window was only partly open in the South Baltic case, since the 150 kilometres rule still limited co-operations with a longer distance across seas. In addition, the South Baltic area was also a special case composing regions from five countries that all had different preferences of how a co-operation could be framed. Consequently, a policy window was partly open, but two problems remained. Firstly, someone needed to further open the so called policy window. Secondly, the policy streams had not been coupled.

6.3 How policy entrepreneurs influenced the establishment process

Due to the EU's new regulation Sweden and Denmark could receive remarkably more EU funding for interregional co-operation. Putting more emphasis on European territorial co-operation and allowing co-operations across the sea, this meant that Sweden actually could receive more than double what they did the previous period for interregional co-operations (N.SWE). Since Sweden and Denmark are not eligible for objective 1, (Convergence), and proportionately receive a smaller amount in object 2 (Regional competitiveness and employment), they were and still are motivated to work for the funding from the objective 3 (European territorial cooperation). On the other hand, Poland and other new EU member states are not dedicated to objective 3, since they already receive a bigger amount of funds through objective 1 and 2. They are also aware of the fact that if the EU put more emphasis on objective 3, the amount for objectives 1 and 2 will probably decrease and these countries as a result loose funding (AUTHOR, SN.EUBAL).

Due to economic reasons the initial motivations for cross-border co-operations were bigger in Sweden and Denmark than in the other countries. This was moreover noticeable in the beginning of the establishment process. The two Swedish member regions of the Euroregion Baltic; Kalmar and Blekinge felt a bigger support from their national government than other regions in the other countries did. Skåne, the third region in Sweden that already had a co-operation with Denmark was not initially very active. The establishment process therefore began in Sweden where Kalmar and Blekinge were very keen to establish a cross-border co-operation so they could be eligible for Interreg funding. Their initial goal was to establish an Interreg programme covering the same area as the Euroregion Baltic (SN.EURBAL, SNSWE1, SNSWE2).

However, Euroregion Baltic area was not seen as a good alternative. Firstly, the actors from the Swedish government wanted bigger programmes in line with the EU Commission (N.SWE). Secondly, the Euroregion Baltic called for an European neighbourhood programme, so Kalingrad one of the organisation's

members could take part, but the idea did not receive any support from the EU (SN.EUBAL). Thirdly, if it became the same area as the Euroregion Baltic, Euroregion Pommerania would than be abandoned. Moreover, Skåne also declared that they did not want to transform Euroregion Pommerania into an Interreg programme. Skåne, was after a promise that the Öresund region would not be affected more in favour to be included in the Euroregion Baltic area. An interviewee representing Skåne in Euroregion Pomerania expresses it as "we left our friends" in Pommerania and finally we became allied with Kalmar and Blekinge (SN.EUPOM).

Despite the problems mentioned above no one really gave up. The regions in Sweden and most regions in the Euroregion Baltic were convinced that they could become a cross-border co-operation in the framework of Interreg. However, the 150 kilometres rule was very problematic and that both the Swedish government started against the Commission. Representatives from the Euroregion Baltic were very active but with much help and support from the Swedish government. Finally, the Commission signalled that they maybe could compromise on the 150 kilometres rule but they then wanted parts of Lithuania, Germany, and moreover one region in Poland within the co-operation, that is to say Lithuania as well as the parts from Euroregion Pomerania (EU2). The Euroregion Baltic felt happiness about that the EU was willing to compromise but was not very pleased about the fact that the Euroregion Baltic area could not be eligible as an Interreg programme. Many times during the process they suggested two sub-programmes within the South Baltic programme, which repeatedly were rejected by the EU and national representatives from Sweden, Denmark and Poland (SN.EUBAL, Minutes from Gdansk 17.10.2006)

In situations like this when there are a lot of different preferences and policy streams that are not coupling; it is as explained in the theory necessary with a few policy entrepreneurs. These must be willing to invest their resources in time, energy, reputation and money in order to soften up the system and push through a decision. These must further have special qualities in order to be the driving force in the process. When the interviewees in the South Baltic co-operation were asked to name a key person they all pin-pointed a Swedish national representative named Ulf Savbäck as the motor for the establishment of the co-operation. Subnational interviewees agreed that they would not be able to establish the South Baltic programme without him and the qualities he had (SN.DK, SN.SWE1, SN.SWE2). An interviewee remarks that he had both formal and informal power since he represented the national government. He also had a wider experience of how to establish new cross-border co-operations in the framework of Interreg and moreover he had good negotiation skills. At last he was committed and had strong belief that it would be possible to establish a cross-co-operation despite the obstacles (SN.SWE1). Another subnational interviewee claims that if the national actors had not participated the establishment process would not have been so successful. Furthermore, he states that it is because of the national level that the establishment process worked so smoothly (SN.DK). However, it is significant that the South Baltic co-operation was established in the way Swedish national

actors wanted and the requests from subnational actors to have two sub-programmes were not particularly considered.

Also the polish subnational representatives that had started to discuss with Sweden noted that they did not have the competence to establish an Interreg programme and that they were dependent on their national level. However, the national government in Poland hesitated. Regional actors from Gdansk sent them a large quantity of letters signed by the Marshall (the president of the region) to encourage the national government, but for a long time it was not successful (SN.PL). The so called Swedish national policy entrepreneur himself admitted that they changed their mind when he suggested that Poland could be responsible for the Managing Authority and that the Joint Technical Secretariat could have its base in Gdansk (N.SWE). A polish national interviewee partly confirmed and said that this gave some form of "prestige" (N.PL). Interestingly it was the national actor's achievement that contributed to the polish national level decision to invest their time, energy and money on the co-operation. The power from Polish and Swedish subnational actors was accordingly too weak.

After the decision by the Polish government, there were now both subnational and national actors from Sweden and Poland that could start to establish a co-operation. Within was also a subnational actor from Bornholm in Denmark. He has been described as person with high commitment to different kinds of co-operations (ibid). That is to say he was another policy entrepreneur but on the Danish side. The national representatives from Denmark did not have any resources and time to take part in the initial phase, so they gave the subnational actor all the responsibility (SN:DK). This does in some sense show that the Danish national level did not consider that the cross-border co-operation could undermine the power of the nation-state.

Lithuania and Germany were also encouraged to participate and were invited to the meetings but they never showed up. The regional representatives started drafting a programme but thought that no further steps should be taken before Lithuania and Germany had changed their minds and joined (Minutes from Gdansk 24.05.2006 and Szczecin.28.06.2006). Without their participation the Commission would likely not approve the programme. Lithuania changed their mind in the summer of 2006. In Lithuania there is no regional level so everything was decided on a national level. The reason for why they hesitated was that the EU's funding would be the same to the country whether they joined or not. Hence, it was necessary that they were fully convinced that this programme had numerous advantages.

Germany was the last country that had to change their mind. Swedish national actors went several times to Germany in order to convince them to join but without any results. Although, suddenly Germany expressed their willingness to join the South Baltic Programme. There was none amongst the actors who really understood why they changed their mind. However, the interviews conducted with German actors explain how the process in Germany also was dependent on policy entrepreneurs. Three different key persons have been identified as policy entrepreneurs. Firstly, one subnational actor was fighting for Rostock's rights to belong to an Interreg programme. He explains Meckenburg-Vorpommern's

parliament resistance that they instead had a willingness to support other weaker regions in their state. It was thought that Rostock was already too powerful city compared to others in the state and had got "endless of privileged" both during Hitler's time and also during the era of communism. The majority in the parliament in Schwerin preferred therefore rather weaker parts of its state (SN.GER). A second policy entrepreneur that Rostock took help from was a national actor who was asked to convince his colleagues. He explains that his own role was to convince his colleagues, who have not understood the potential of the programme and its benefit. His colleagues did not realise that they would lose funding if they did not join. They stilled hoped that they could use the EU funding for some of Meckenburg Vorpommern's other programmes (N.GER2). A third policy entrepreneur came from the region Sjaeland in Denmark and he spent a lot of time in order to convince the Germans to take part. Sjeaeland in contrast to Germany did not favour a separate cross-border co-operation between the regions from the both states. Sjealand rather wanted Germany within South Baltic for the reason that Germany still is the prime co-operation partner to Sjeaeland (SN.GER, SN.DK). These three policy entrepreneurs and the fact that the state chancellor was changed to one that originally came from Rostock, contributed to that Germany finally declared their interest to join in the South Baltic co-operation.

Even though all subnations now had agreed on the co-operation area and that the EU at the same time had given its confirmation that this was a suitable area for an Interreg programme, it did not mean that the establishment process was completely finished. The programme had to be written and it was necessary to agree upon the priorities axis that would state the contents of the programme. The writing process was partly delegated to the subnational representatives and will therefore be discussed in the chapter about the horizontal dimension.

Despite the fact that not the whole establishment process has been described in this chapter, it is at this point possible to answer the research question of what and whom that drove the process to establish the South Baltic cross-border co-operation. Firstly, it has been illustrated that the establishment process was not driven by a defined problem in the South Baltic area that needed a solutions. Rather, there was an array of policy streams of problems, solutions, participants and the participants' resources and in particular different suggestions of how to co-operate. These so called policy streams had not been joined and waited for the right opportunity. When the EU changed their regulation the opportunity arose and a policy window opened for land-sea cross-border co-operations. Actors knew that if the policy streams were quickly joined a South Baltic co-operation could be possible. Hence the EU's action can be seen as the stepping point of the establishment process.

However, the policy streams would not be joined by themselves. Without any policy entrepreneurs the process would cease. Likewise, without any earlier co-operations and partnerships the establishment process would probably take longer than the accepted timeframe. As described there has been a few policy entrepreneurs defined almost from all countries, representing both subnational and national level. Nevertheless it was a Swedish policy entrepreneur that played the

most essential role in order to couple the policy streams, softening up the system and who made participants compromise.

At last, it is from analysing the earliest steps in the establishment process possible to comment on whether the cross-border co-operation strengthen or undermine the power of the nation-state. Even though subnational actors were active in the process, it was the EU and the national level and particular the Swedish one that were the most determining factors for in the formation of the South Baltic co-operation. Consequently, since the national states were positively active the new cross-border co-operation could not really be seen as a challenge to the nation-state. Putting together different subnations with no common existing local co-operation structures and no common agenda, and where national actors had the power of the structure could barely undermine the national level. Rather, the cross-border co-operation in lack of own local co-operation structures may have to depend more upon the central authorities and are most likely employed in the context of states general policy objectives.

7   The vertical dimension in the case of the South Baltic co-operation

The purpose of this chapter is to understand the South Baltic cross-border co-operation's power dependence upon the EU and the national governments. This may however first require an insight into what kind of cross-border co-operation it is. Hence the first section in this chapter seeks to explore the co-operation's structure trough the created regional ideal types in chapter 4 (also illustrated in a model on page 19). The second section can then shed light on how and to what extent the EU and the national states can influence and determine the South Baltic co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened.

7.1   The character of the South Baltic co-operation

As previously indicated the South Baltic co-operation constitutes a territory with border regions of five EU Member States. Thus neither the membership is fluctuating, nor the co-operation area is territorial delimitated, it can at an early stage be falsified that the co-operation would be an issue network. The membership in South Baltic co-operation is rather quite defined as well as the territorial area of the co-operation.

Considering the membership, the co-operation is formalised in one Steering Committee (SC) and one Monitoring Committee (MC), where the different countries have appointed their own national and subnational representatives. The Steering Committee decides on which projects should be approved and the Monitoring Committee are responsible for the overall questions for example; implementation of the programme, how money is spent and if they want to change the structure of the programme (JTS).

The eligible area is also quite defined even though it is not completely territorial delimited as it would be in a policy community. A map of the co-operation area is attached in Appendix 2. Depending on where the regions are situated, they are divided into different categories. Firstly, there is a core programme area. The subnations included in this area have among others a vote in the MC and the SC. Secondly, there are adjacent areas. Thirdly, Kaliningrad can take part on other conditions. The adjacent areas are allowed to participate in projects up to a limit of 20 percent of the programmes' expenditures applicable to the entire programme area and Kaliningrad up to 10 percent (*South Baltic Cross-Border Co-operation Programme,* 2007 p.7). It is also possible for actors in other

regions in the five countries to take part, if the projects purpose is to improve the state of the South Baltic area (JTS).

Interaction is another thing that differs between an issue network, a policy network and a policy community. Also here it is significant that the South Baltic co-operation is most similar to a policy network. The interaction is not frequent as in the case of a policy community but yet on a regular basis. The SC and the MC have meetings twice a year. However, the Monitoring Authority in Warsaw and the Contact Points, which are small offices widespread over co-operation area assisting the project partners, meet four times a year (N.PL1).

In addition, the South Baltic's interest is identical with a policy network constricted and contracted to some agreed policy areas. The South Baltic co-operation's operational programme outlines two main priorities, in which funds are available for project partners. Firstly, *Economic competitiveness* focus on "actions promoting integration of economic and labour markets in the area, co-operation in technical and higher education, transfer of knowledge and know-how between public and private actors and better transport connectivity". Secondly, the last priority axis, *Attractiveness and common identity* focus on "management of environmental threats and actions promoting sustainable economic use of natural resources and cultural heritage, with particular attention to tourism, development of renewable energy sources and energy saving, as well as local initiatives supporting people to-people contacts" (*South Baltic Cross-Border Co-operation Programme,* 2007 p.28). This implies that focus is on some selected co-operation areas and where it is decided how much of the funds each priority theme is allocated. Moreover no general value-system for all issue areas is required, which would be the case in a policy community.

Finally, there are other hallmarks of a policy network that are in line with the South Baltic co-operation. For instance the South Baltic co-operation is characterised by a long-term co-operation aim and its main activities are realisation of concrete projects (AUTHOR, SN.DK).

To conclude the description of the South Baltic co-operation it is clear that most of its hallmarks are comparable with a policy network. The point of departure for the thesis's next section is therefore a policy network. Consequently, maintaining a cross-border co-operation would mean, to avoid returning to a co-operation in terms of an issue network. To deepen a cross-border co-operation would either be within the policy network or to tighten the co-operation through establishing a policy community.

7.2   How the vertical dimensions may influence and determine a maintaining and deepening

Since policy networks main task is to realise concrete projects financial resources are necessary both to carry out projects and to the assistance to the co-ordinated organisation. In a policy network the financial resources are mainly sponsored

from either the EU or from the national governments. The South Baltic cross-border co-operation's financial dependence seems to be no exception. The head officer of the JTS thinks that South Baltic co-operation is a very significant case. She states that a cross-border co-operation without any external resources would not be possible. Further, she explains that the strength of the regional level varies between the different countries and that many subnations do not have their own financial resources. In Poland and Sweden the regions are strong since they have their own budget and strategy to implement. On the other hand, the regional level in Lithuania is weak since most financial resources are regulated by the national government. The subnations from Germany participating in the South Baltic co-operation are only small municipalities; similarly to the parts in Lithuania they do not have any wider capital of financial resources (JTS, EU2). Since all members in a policy community have their own resources it is understood that a policy community in the South Baltic area from a financial point of view would not be possible until the subnations dispose their own resources.

A high dependence on financial resources consequently leads to increased legal dependence and a national influence of the operational discretion. When the national level contributes with financial resources, it is also obvious that their influence may increase in regard to what opportunity the cross-border co-operation has to be maintained or deepened. If national governments do not want to change their legislations and regulations to facilitate cross-border co-operation, it may for example hamper the cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be deepened. This has actually been the case twice in the South Baltic co-operation.

Firstly, the national level in Germany rejected projects to start at their own risk before they had been formally approved. This was in many ways seen as an obstacle for several projects. One interviewee indicates that this was a very critical situation for the whole cross-border co-operation. However, it ended up with the Commission persuading the Germans to change their procedures (N.PL1). According to subnational actors, a second constraint in terms of legislation is the fact that a few countries have not implemented the European Group for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). EGTC's purpose is to facilitate the possibilities for the Euroregions to independently apply for projects funding. Nowadays one of the member regions must instead be a so called lead partner, which impedes the authority of the Euroregions (SN.DK, SN.EUBAL). To summarise the legal dependence, most interviewees do not recognise that the legal dependency constrain the co-operations' opportunity to be maintained. However, earlier experience shows that the interest to delegate further legal authority to the subnational level is very low. So, in terms of legal authority a closer co-operation in forms of a policy community would in time not be possible.

Moreover the fact that the national governments decide upon the level of economical contributions results in limited operational discretion. Even if the South Baltic co-operation receives 75 Million EUR from the EU and the national states it is a comparatively small amount. Subnational interviewees declare that this is a problem and limitation to the programme (SN.EUBAL). For example only soft projects are possible, where the outcome may not be fully observable (AUTHOR).

A second factor that may constrain subnational actor's operational discretion is the EU's guidelines for the structure and the contents of the operational programme. The guidelines do to some degree regulate which priorities the Commission thinks should be covered within the programmes. For the present period the Commission in line with the Gothenburg and the Lisbon strategies focused particularly on economical growth and protection of the environment (SN.DK). Elisabeth Helander who represented the Commission in the early stage of the South Baltic's establishment process, was keen to establish a cross-border co-operation that could contribute to reducing the environmental problems in the Baltic Sea. It is therefore no coincidence that the South Baltic programme does finance projects which relate to environmental protection (N.SWE). As long as the EU and the national states finance the co-operation, there also needs to be coherence between this and other programmes (for example the transnational Baltic Sea Programme and the Central Baltic Sea programme), which furthermore diminish the opportunity for subnational actors to independently decide upon the structure and the contents of the programme (AUTHOR).

A third factor that may constrain subnational actor's operational discretion is the fact that national representatives always are involved in the decision-making process in both the MC and the SC and can stop decisions they do not agree with. This implies that the national will is always secured.

Consequently, the subnational actors' operational discretion is quite limited, but what is then the opportunity that this operational discretion can increase or at least not decrease? From the EU's point of view the reinforcement for cross-border co-operations is generally very strong but also particularly strong for the South Baltic co-operation. This period compared to previous, the Commission has put more emphasis on cross-border co-operation and territorial co-operation. Furthermore, an EU representative notes that "for the discussion leading up to the next period we talk much more about this kind of co-operation regarding what we ever have done before". An additional financial contribution for the next period may therefore be plausible. The EU may also positively influence subnational actors' operational discretion, thus the changing of the system funding is being discussed. Instead of having today's system where the contributions go through the national level, the Commission plans to directly fund the programmes, which would make the programmes more independent from the countries. Moreover, the interviewee representing the Commission expresses a special support for the South Baltic co-operation due to it embracing both new and old member states. He claims that one of the main functions with the cohesion funds is to ascertain division between rich and poor parts of Europe, which the South Baltic co-operation could have a high potential to (EU2). As follows, the EU does from today's condition support a maintaining of the co-operation and there is neither any reason to see that the EU would constrain a deepening of the South Baltic co-operation. If the plans to change the funding system are realised a deepening of the co-operation may even take place.

The national reinforcement is though more diverged, even if most of the national actors have a positive approach towards the co-operation. The greatest reinforcement exists in Sweden and Poland, who also are the countries that

voluntarily sponsor the programme most. A polish actor points out, "there is no reason to initiate a programme, give chance to the beneficial and then after some years cut off the sources" (N.PL). National interviewees from Sweden, Poland and Lithuania also state that programmes like this could be good for the countries as a whole (N.SWE, N.PL, N.LIT). A stakeholder from the national government in Lithuania states that "the South Baltic programme directly impacts economic and cultural life of the whole of Lithuania" (N.LIT). Despite these countries positive attitude towards the South Baltic co-operation the Swedish and Polish actors give no signals that they would support a deepening of the co-operation that for instance would mean more operational discretion to the subnational level as in the case of a policy community. In contrast, a Swedish subnational actor recognises the overriding threat from the national states to centralise the programme (SN.SWE1). It is obvious that the national actors are satisfied with current co-operation structure and consider the South Baltic co-operation as a way to strengthen the national states.

Judging from the interviews, Germany is the only country that would not actively support to maintain the cross-border co-operation. A national actor expresses it as follows "behind the scenes you can see another interest from Sweden than from Germany". Her explanation is that this programme makes a remarkably little difference, since it is such a small part of Germany participating (N.GER1). A German politician responsible for regional development expresses it "es ist egal ob es South Baltic heißt oder etwas anderes" (N.GER3), that is to say it does not matter if Germany take part in the South Baltic or in other co-operations. A third German actor claims that the process to get a project application approved is very complicated and that he would not advice a normal municipality to take part in the programme. Furthermore he states that the fact that everything is in English complicates the programme and implies that most beneficiaries need to have an English spoken consult and the national actors must also in addition be fluent in English (N.GER2). An anonymous person confirms the low interest from the German national level and states that "it is a scandal" that the head of the German delegation does not speak English and cannot accordingly defend Germany's concern in the SC and the MC. It should also be added that the new head of the German delegation renounced an interview and that it was very difficult to find interviewees in Germany since most of early delegations have resigned. Evaluating Germans national actors' way to argue it is clear that since they do not see any added value at national level, their interest for the co-operation is limited.

A last factor that will likely influence a maintaining or deepening of the South Baltic co-operation and which also partly confirm that the South Baltic co-operation is a tool in order to strengthen the national states own goals is the new Baltic Sea Strategy. The main stakeholders in the strategy represent the national level and the European Commission, even if the regional level has been heard (N.GER2). At the Commission's webpage it is stated that "the Strategy aims at coordinating action by Member States, regions, the EU, pan-Baltic organisations, financing institutions and non-governmental bodies to promote a more balanced development of the region." Furthermore four cornerstones are outlined to make

the Baltic Sea more environmentally sustainable, prosperous, accessible and attractive and safe and secure (www.ec.europe.eu, 30.07.2009). It is obvious that the Baltic Sea Strategy purpose is to capture a macro-thinking. All cross-border co-operations in the Baltic Sea will play an important function when it comes to implementing the strategy. In fact, ongoing projects need to be checked so that they are in line with the Baltic Sea Strategy before they can be approved (N.PL). The Baltic Sea Strategy has also listed eighty different kinds of projects they want to have carried out. If a partner wish to carry out one of the projects, their application to do so is more probable to pass. This implies that subnational actors' operational discretion will be even more constrained and that a development from the today's policy network towards a more independent policy community is precluded.

However, the effects of the Baltic Sea Strategy are still to this day unknown. It is clear that the Swedish and Finish government have the greatest interest since them both to a large extent border the Baltic Sea. A German interviewee that recently worked for the Commission states that Sweden and Finland are the driving force and tries to find alliance for their own political objectives. Some of the other countries do not see a wider added value with the strategy say "we are a little more laid back and we will play your game but we are not too enthusiastic" (N.GER2).

Consequently, the Baltic Sea Strategy will affect the South Baltic's opportunity to be maintained and deepened even if it is unknown to what extent. However, it is clear that national actors hold a macro-thinking and do not see the South Baltic co-operation as a part by itself, rather a co-operation that should be co-ordinated with other programmes and enhance the states capacity to achieve their objectives. To conclude the vertical dimension, a maintaining is most likely due to; EU's reinforcement, most national actor keenness and also since the Baltic Sea Strategy supports cross-border co-operations in the Baltic Sea area. However, a deepening in terms of a policy community is not from a national point of view an alternative since no added value can be seen. Current co-operation structure is from a national point of view the most optimal co-operation structure. They then take part in the decision-making process, control the development of the co-operation and can also take advantage of the co-operation. A deeper co-operation in form of a policy community would only imply less control by the states and the advantages for the states are from the national point of view estimated to be diminished or unchanged.

8 The horizontal dimension in the case of the South Baltic co-operation

In the previous chapter it was concluded from a vertical dimension point of view that a maintaining of the South Baltic co-operation as a policy network is most likely. The national reinforcement is though not specially directed to the South Baltic co-operation. Most of the national actors have rather a more generally encouraging approach towards all cross-border co-operations and see them as a tool in order to strengthen their own political objectives. It has been indicated that a deepening of a co-operation can undermine the power of the nation-state within the co-operation area and the national governments would therefore constrain a development towards a policy community.

However, subnational actors may also have the potential to influence the co-operation's opportunity to be maintained or deepened. From an agency perspective the horizontal dimension should have the ability and capacity to determine its own future. If the territorial entitles match each other and the co-operation has a high level of bottom-up involvement and if it is promoted by subnational actors, the greater is the chances that they can influence their own destiny. With a strong unification it is also assumed that they to a higher extent can undermine the power of the nation-state.

In the theoretical chapter about the horizontal dimension a framework was outlined for how to analyse subnational actors' opportunity to maintain and deepen their cross-border co-operation. If they should be able to maintain or deepen their co-operation some factors must be fulfilled. First after these factors are fulfilled it can be discussed whether the cross-border co-operation can undermine the power of the national-state. The factors discussed in subsequent parts are also illustrated in a figure on page 20.

8.1 Strategic unification and relation resources

Subnational actors' potential to influence the co-operation's opportunity to be maintained or deepened often relies on a feeling of strategic unification. If subnational actors do not feel any strategic unification they will probably be quite indifferent to either maintain or deepen the co-operation. In order to experience strategic unification some technical factors must primarily be fulfilled. In the case of the South Baltic co-operation the technical factors do not correspond to a policy network rather merely an issue network.

Most subnational interviewees are neither satisfied with the size of the population nor the geography. Statements like "we are too many" and "the geography is artificial" is repeatedly expressed during the interviews (SN.DK, SN.EURBAL, SN.GER, SN.SWE1). Most actors desire smaller programmes and each interviewee suggests other geographic co-operation structures than the one today. For example Rostock wants to include Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein (SN.GER). Euroregion Baltic attempts to reshape the current co-operation and move it eastwards. Skåne, is on the other hand of different opinions, where the municipalities want to co-operate with Poland and Germany but where the region prioritises other countries, like China (SN.EURPOM). The head office of the JTS also notes that the co-operation was artificially created and that it is not a natural cross-border region. Furthermore, she states that sometimes it is hard to find projects that benefit all counterparts due to the sea (JTS). A last technical factor that constrains a deepening of the co-operation at the moment is that the South Baltic area shows strong development disparities between the respective subnations and that the economical exchange is not as high as would be the case in a policy network and particular a policy community would require (SN.PL). The co-operation area includes both one of the richest regions in the EU as well as one of the poorest. (*South Baltic Cross-Border Co-operation Programme,* 2007 p.10).

The economical disparities can also be reflected in various objectives for action and intervention within the co-operation. If subnational actors should have the ability to influence the co-operation's opportunities to be deepened or maintained a policy network, they must have a mutually shared vision and interest. However, the subnations are on such different economical levels and have different priorities in issues. This, among others factors, became clear when subnational actors were delegated to write the substance of the programme. Their visions and interests were so widely divergent that the subnational actors could not agree upon the priorities axis. One interviewee remarks that she has never before attended a meeting with such an aggressive spirit and with so dominant people (SN.SWE). Another says, that the discussions were so heated that we almost hurt each other (SN.DK). A third stakeholder states that "people stuck to their guns" (SN.EURBAL). Finally, the process stranded and the actors decided to call for help. The consultant hired explains in the interview about the competing priorities. Sweden wanted to use the funding for innovation, Poland defended the importance of infrastructure, Germany argued for social issues like well-being of its citizens. Furthermore, Bornholm wanted to fund people to-people activities. All these intentions should also follow the guidelines from the EU and be in coherence with other programmes. The consult states, "It required quite a lot of experience from me to say what worked and what did not and to find a proposal that all could agree upon" (AUTHOR). All subnational actors do also confirm that they would not manage it by themselves. What is indicated is that some of the participants tried to influence the outcome, only considering their own territorial interest. Actors' ambitions were so diverged that they needed someone that unified them, which in some sense shows the weakness and the lack of capacity of subnational to single-handedly unify the region.

A third factor, which also has been identified as a relation resource, is a common identity. However, it was argued that this is more essential in closer co-operations like a policy community. In the case of the South Baltic co-operation none of the interviewees recognises that the region has a common identity. Nevertheless, many emphasises a common identity as one of the programme's goals, even though most interviewees do not think it is possible to build a common identity in the framework of this programme. Consequently, the common identity which is to prefer for a policy community is in the South Baltic not likely in the near future.

If a cross-border co-operation should be able to deepen their co-operation a forth factor in the analytical framework emphasises cultural and institutional similarities as vital. Considering similarities within the South Baltic co-operation several subnational actors mentioned the regions' common history. Although, the cultural similarities that once existed were erased mostly during the fifty years of communism (SN.PL). Today's co-operation must therefore, according to one subnational actor, start to "bring together what belongs together" (SN.GER).

None of the subnational actors think that the cultural and institutional differences are so substantial that they constrain the current co-operation. However, a closer co-operation would require the differences to decline. The differences are primarily linked to the fact that the co-operation both embraces parts from new and old EU Member States. There is one block of Scandinavian subnations and one block that consist of the subnations from the young democracies. In contrast to the new EU Member States, the Scandinavian block is characterised by a flat hierarchy, where civil servants have a wider authority to make decisions. Moreover, politicians in Scandinavia are to a higher extent involved in the working process in contrast to other countries.

These differences can sometimes cause a problematic situation in the SC and the MCs' decision making processes. Subnational civil servants from Sweden and partially Denmark explain that due to the fact that it is a part of their culture to have politicians in committees like these, they have also appointed some politicians. Yet, the subnational servants agree that their politicians do have a lack of knowledge since they do not work with the co-operation full-time. This implies that the Swedish and Danish delegations sometimes feel that they are comparatively weaker compared to other delegations consisting of only civil servants, or alternatively they must have one civil servant for each politicians during the meetings in order to advice them. On the other hand, since the civil servants from Sweden and Denmark participate jointly with the politicians their delegation has more authority to take decisions on behalf of their regions. Other participants from the other countries are more limited and very often they cannot take decisions until they have conferred with employees in higher position in their subnation. Consequently, this can contribute to two kinds of frustrations. Firstly, some do not understand why politicians who lack knowledge must participate and secondly some have no understanding for why the decision-making process must be so long (SN.SWE1, SN.EUPOM, JTS, AUTHOR).

A second cultural and institutional difference, as previous mentioned, is that in some countries, for example Lithuania, there is no strong and evident regional

level. This complicates the process for subnational actors to independently influence the co-operations progress, since national and regional level is about the same.

Finally, there are also several different cultural and institutional customs less serious but nevertheless constrain a smooth co-operation. For example a polish actor explains that all official documents must be stamped on every page in Poland. "We sometimes did not know if paper from Sweden were valued or not since they were not stamped", she remembers. Some Swedes were on the other hand not very pleased to buy stamps only because Poland required it (N.PL2). Furthermore, irritation has been a factor several times, thus Swedish and Danish actors consider themselves as more organised and structured. One Swedish subnational actor expresses that in the beginning it was "chaos" and that they never got the documents they were promised (SN.SWE1).

Despite these cultural and institutional differences, a wider understanding and mutual trust has grown during the first years of co-operation. According to the theory it can be stated that the co-operation started on fairly bad premises. Firstly, past networks or strategies which covered the whole South Baltic area were absent. Secondly, it was only a few of the participants that knew each other beforehand. Thirdly, as indicated above it was to some extent difficult for the subnational actor to be of the same opinion and to understand each other. However, most interviewees think that this is gradually changing. One interviewee describes it like a process. He remembers the bad co-operation climate in 2006, but declares that after "we got to know each other and we got more and more friendly" (SN.EUBAL). The head of the JTS and the EU's representative also refer to the current trustful climate in the meetings and think that the co-operation is more mature now than before (JTS, EU1).

In contrast, according to one subnational actor this trustful and mutually good relationship is only prevalent in a core group; between the staff in the JTS, the Contact Points and the Managing Authority. Participants in the SC and the MC who do not see each other that often still have not had the opportunity to build up the trust among them. The subnational actor, with very long experience from different kinds of co-operations, also sadly recognises how Swedish and Danish people are unjustified suspicious of Polish people, which sometimes hampers a deeper co-operation. Furthermore, considering the shift of participants in the SC and the MC but also the shifts of people in more leading positions that have taken place (SN.DK) it may result in a lack of a longer personalised trust, which a co-operation often relies on. To conclude the last factor under the theme strategic unification and relation resources, concerning an understanding and mutual trust is on an adequate level of which corresponds to what a policy network require. Although, the mutual trust does not include all participants and definitely not the whole population within the cross-border co-operation, which further is a requirement for a policy community.

In sum, considering the technical factors and the shared vision the South Baltic co-operation is more similar to an issue network than a policy network. However, the three last factors which were outlined in the theory are reasonably fulfilled in correspondence to a policy network. Consequently, the strategic

unification and the relation resources are not that strong that subnational actor would have the capacity to deepen the co-operation towards a policy community. But still they may be able to maintain the policy network depending on how further horizontal factors are fulfilled.

8.2   Common knowledge resources and leadership

As indicated above the writing process of the South Baltic's Operational Programme was not unproblematic; different stakeholders had diverse frames of references, focused their analysis and understanding on different issues and had competing priorities. This should per definition mean that there was a lack of common knowledge resources. It has also been pointed out that there still are some divergent visions in what forms subnational actors want to cooperate in, which further would support the assertion that there is a lack of common knowledge resources. However, a cross-border co-operation can have different degrees of common knowledge resources. Three criteria were outlined in the analytical framework and what type of common knowledge resources is required for each form of co-operation.

The first criterion is fulfilled in the South Baltic co-operation. All interviewees experienced that they have access to available information. The JTS and the Contact Points play an important role to support different actors with available information. In addition several chapters in the Operational Programme, written by the consultant, also describe the co-operation area and define its problem from different points of view.

The second criterion regarding opportunities to absorb new ideas and learn from each other is also partly fulfilled. Polish stakeholders notice how much they learned from Swedish and Danish actors. They state that Sweden and Denmark have more experience of international co-operation and of co-operation within the framework of Interreg (SN.PL, N.PL1). A representative for the Managing Authority tells that they often ask Swedish and Danish civil servants for advice. She says that they are "never showing us off" they just help us in a pedagogical manner. In contrast, Sweden and Denmark also learn about the systems in the new EU Member States (N.PL1). Nevertheless, the learning process is mostly one directional, from the old EU Member States to the new. This further confirms that the third criterion is not fulfilled.

The third criterion, to provide knowledge of analogues manner is not the case within the South Baltic co-operation. Another stakeholder gives an example and claims that Germany and Lithuania contribute with less ideas and knowledge. It is on the other hand understandable, since those have invested less financial resources in the co-operation (SN.EUBAL). In sum, the common knowledge resources in the South Baltic are on such a level that is sufficient for a policy network. For a deeper co-operation a more equal contribution would be preferred.

In order to maximize the utilization of the knowledge resources some form of leadership is beneficial. Whereas the leadership is performed by the national

states, the EU or the subnational actors make a considerable difference. If the subnational level should have a chance to influence and determine whether the South Baltic co-operation's opportunities ought to be maintained and deepened it is advantageous if they exercise the leadership by themselves. This is however not the case in the South Baltic co-operation, albeit leadership cannot really be defined. All interviewees appoint different leaders that adhere to both the subnational and national level as well as the EU level. It is quite clear that the leadership is shared. One of the participator in the SC and the MC refers to the last meetings and claims that it was obvious that different stakeholders both from the subnational and national level take responsibility for the co-operations progress (SN.EUBAL). Consequently, the leadership is not merely exercised by subnational actors and there is definitely no leadership that challenge and problematise the concept of the national state, as could be the case in a policy community. Rather, the leadership is on such level that is required for a policy network.

8.3   Mobilisation capacity

There are three forms of mobilisations, to which different co-operations rely on; politicians' support, officers' enthusiasm and public support.

Firstly, a policy network like the South Baltic co-operation depends on politician's support. The local parliaments or equivalent must accept the co-operation before the establishment, and obviously they did so in the case of the South Baltic co-operation. Consequently, the politician's support is on a sufficient level required for a policy network. However, several subnational officials had desired a more active support from politicians in order to satisfy a democratic representation. They claim that their relations to politicians are to inform them and not to communicate with them. Furthermore, the officials had hoped that politicians were more prepared for the meeting and had a higher competence (SN.GER, SN.SWE, SN.DK). Several countries do not have any politicians in the SC and MC. A closer co-operation, like in a policy community could be difficult due to the lack of interest and participation from politicians.

Secondly, the officers' enthusiasm seems diverged. One interviewee states that there is "enough will to overcome administrative, legal and cultural differences" (JTS). In contrast, it appears that several officers have left their duties and the co-operation, where the reasons cannot really be defined. One interviewee does for example tell that the previous head of the JTS resigned and she states that "he was due to the whole organisational issues basically tired of the situation" (N.PL1). Moreover, the earlier discussion about how subnational actors consider how to reshape the structure of the programme does also confirm some form of dissatisfaction among the civil servants. In sum it seems like the officers' enthusiasm is sufficient in order to maintain the co-operation but a deepening of the co-operation is probably not possible considering the bureaucratic interest.

Thirdly, public support has been difficult to evaluate partly due to the simple reason that citizens are not aware about the cross-border co-operation's existence. One stakeholder states that this programme is not established in the public sphere (SN:EUPOM). Interviewees also indicate that media is very uninterested to write anything about the programme, which implies that the programme still is very much unknown to the public (JTS, SN.GER). However, the JTS and the Contact Points use different methods to inform about the programme. Nevertheless, the promoting is concentrated on reaching potential project partners and not the general public (JTS). Finally, the potential project partners' interest may often be diverged. The author of the programme states that the problem with these kinds of programmes is the attractiveness to project partners. Since programmes often hamper bigger projects several project partners do not see any added value. An unanswered question is how big the public support could be when the interest from project partners still is rather limited.

In sum, the internal mobilisation within the cross-border co-operation is adequate but it is not strong enough. The subnational actors themselves would not be able to maintain the co-operation without any external support and have the capacity to deepen the co-operation fails.

9 Conclusions

This thesis has sought to examine whether cross-border co-operations in the framework of Interreg can strengthen or undermine the power of the nation-state. Two operational questions and a developed analytical framework have constituted a guide for the analysis.

The first of the two operational questions; what and whom drove the process to establish the South Baltic cross-border co-operation, was examined through a decision-making model adopted by Kingdon. It was found that the establishment process was not driven by a single defined problem in the South Baltic area; rather it was a compound of different policy streams that were joined and which decided the outcome. Originally, there was a diverse range of ideas of how to co-operate. However, it was the long-standing cross-border co-operation Euroregion Baltic that embraced most of its subnations in the current South Baltic co-operation that was the contributing factor to the cross-border co-operation and that it should be an Interreg programme. Their idea was that they through Interreg funding could start to implement the Joint Development programme, which they on subnational level had agreed upon without any influence from the national level.

When the EU for its new Cohesion period 2007-13 declared that the regulations should be changed and land-sea cross border co-operations should be possible; a so called policy window opened for cross-border co-operation in the framework of Interreg in the South Baltic area. Consequently, EU's action can be seen as the starting-point of the establishment process. However, it was later the national actors that became the prime force in the establishment process. The Swedish government saw greater opportunities for more EU-funding compared to other countries and a stakeholder on national level invested remarkably both in time and energy in order to establish a cross-border co-operation within the framework of Interreg. It is obvious that the national government in Sweden estimated substantial advantages with a programme like this.

The Swedish government, in line with the other countries' governments and the EU, were not in favour of having two programmes in South Baltic area; one programme for Euroregion Baltic and one for the Euroregion Pommerania. In contrast, they preferred a bigger programme that not necessarily was compatible with old co-operation structures. The establishment process was therefore driven in accordance with the national states' strategy. The subnational actors supported and also worked for the establishment of the South Baltic co-operation, but if the EU and the national governments had not constrained them they would have prioritised other forms of co-operation.

The fact that the national level and the EU did not allow Interreg funding to long-standing cross-border co-operations like Euroregion Baltic and Euroregion Pomerania, implies that the national governments in the current co-operation

structure have more influence on the agenda setting than they would have if the old structures would be transformed into an Interreg programme. Furthermore, establish a total new co-operation compared to develop the old ones, makes the new cross-border co-operation less political, which diminish the chance for the cross-border co-operation to undermine the power of the nation-state.

The third research question focuses on present time and concerns what potential subnational actors have to maintain and deepen their cross-border co-operation compared to the EU and the national states. Linked to the first question of a more general character it is assumed that if the influence of the national state determine the cross-border co-operations' opportunities to be maintained or deepened, it is not likely that the power of the nation-state is undermined. On the other hand, power of the national states can in a long-run be hollowed out if subnational actors are united to work towards a closer co-operation with less power dependence upon the EU and the national governments and if they have more operational discretion. In order to answer the third research question an analytical framework was developed, which considered both a vertical and a horizontal dimension.

The vertical dimension explains the multilevel structure, which the cross-border co-operations are embedded in. From the employing of the constructed ideal types it can be concluded that the South Baltic co-operation, like a policy network, has a high level of power dependence on the nation states and the EU. The cross-border co-operation is dependent upon external financial resources and has a high legal dependence, which results in a limited operational discretion. Due to lack of resources the cross-border co-operation cannot initiate bigger projects. EU guidelines regarding the structure and the contents of the programmes do also constrain the operational discretion. Furthermore, the fact that national actors take part in the co-operation's Steering Committee and Monitoring Committee makes subnational actors within the co-operation less independent. According to the vertical dimension it is clear that it in the current situation it is the EU and the national states that influence and determine the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened.

Through the examination of the reinforcement from the national governments and the EU it can be concluded that there are opportunities to maintain the co-operation. From the EU's point of view the reinforcement for cross-border co-operations is generally strong in particular regarding the South Baltic co-operation, since it embraces both subnations from new and old member states. Most national states do also see several advantages that can strengthen the national states as a whole. The national reinforcement is not especially directed towards South Baltic co-operation; instead the national level holds a macro-thinking which also is visible in the new Baltic Sea Strategy. The national states generally have an encouraging approach towards all kinds of cross-border co-operations and see them as a tool in order to strengthen their own political objectives. Some countries, especially Germany do not recognise how the South Baltic co-operation can strengthen the national states, however they would not reject to a maintaining of the South Baltic co-operation thus the cross-border co-operation do not undermine the power of the national states.

A deepening of the cross-border co-operation is from the national view not likely as the current co-operation structure is optimal. As it is today; representatives from the national governments take part in the decision-making process, control the development of the co-operation and can also take advantage of the co-operation. A deeper co-operation like the ideal type policy community would only imply less control by the states and the advantages are from the national point of view estimated to either be diminished or unchanged. The EU's idea of changing the funding system to next cohesion period in terms of directly funding the programmes rather than letting the funding go through the national level may result in cross-border co-operations less dependent on the national level. Similarly, the EU also plans to increase the total amount of Interreg funding which may result in closer cross-border co-operations. In sum, from a vertical point of view a maintaining is possible due both the position on the EU and the national governments. A deepening would, albeit EU's support, probably not be possible due to various degree of commitment from the national governments.

However, a cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be maintained or deepened cannot only be examined through a vertical dimension. The subnational actors can also influence and determine the cross-border co-operation's future. In the analytical framework, the horizontal dimension outlined different factors of what needs to be fulfilled; if the subnational should be able to influence the cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be maintained or deepened.

It can be concluded that subnational actors do not have the capacity or the ability to deepen their co-operation. This conclusion can be drawn since subnational actors are neither satisfied with the size of the population nor the geography of the cross-border region. The economical disparities between the subnations and the diverse visions for action and intervention within the co-operation are also too wide for subnational actors own ability to deepen the co-operation. The cultural and institutional differences are also evaluated as being too visible for the subnations own capacity to deepen the co-operation. The understanding and mutual trust exist, but not to the extent that is required for a closer co-operation. Furthermore, common knowledge resources and leadership were examined. Also from this point of view a deepening can be difficult since the subnations do not provide knowledge of analogues manner. Moreover, there is no leadership at subnational level that can specify the direction on the co-operation and keep the co-operation on track, which makes it difficult to deepen the co-operation without a leadership from either the national states or the EU. Finally, the mobilisation capacity at subnational level is also too weak for the subnational actor's own opportunity to deepen the co-operation. There is a lack of interest and participation from politicians. The officers' enthusiasm seems to be on an adequate level. However, several subnational actors have left their duties within the co-operation and many still want to reshape the outline of the programme, which makes a deepening of current co-operation structure difficult.

A maintaining of the co-operation from the horizontal dimension may however be possible. The cultural and institutional differences do not to a wider extent hamper the co-operation and there is an understanding of mutual trust between a core group of the most active within the co-operation. All subnational

actors have access to available information, to absorb new ideas and learn from each other. Furthermore, there is enough will to overcome administrative, legal and cultural differences. Although, it is clear that the subnational actors' capacity and ability to maintain their co-operation is rather limited without support from the EU or the national states.

From examining both the establishment process and how different actors can influence the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained or deepened it can be concluded that the South Baltic co-operation is a cross-border co-operation in the hands of the national states and the EU. The national states and the EU established the cross-border co-operation as they considered correct following their political objectives. Subnational actors desired something else but still thought the South Baltic co-operation to be an acceptable compromise. The fact that the national states were highly involved in the establishment process implies that the process is more comparable to a top-down process than a bottom-up. Furthermore, as national actors exceedingly drove the process to establish the South Baltic co-operation it is also in the present co-operation reflected that the national states are the ones which primarily determine the co-operation's opportunity to maintain or deepen. This is due to the fact that subnational actors are not too well compatible and do not have their own agenda. Rather the co-operation is embedded in a macro-thinking about how the whole Baltic Sea and the nations along the sea should be strengthened. A final conclusion is therefore that a cross-border co-operation like the South Baltic co-operation in the framework of Interreg strengthens rather than undermine the territorial state system.

The situation might be different if the EU and the national states had allowed long-standing cross-border co-operations, like the Euroregions to be eligible for Interreg funding. The subnational actors would then be more compatible, the co-operation would have its own agenda and the result may even be better since they have long experience of cross-border co-operations on voluntary basis. However, the national governments' influence would then probably decrease and a macro-thinking of the whole Baltic See could be constrained. This thesis do not seek to give any recommendations but if the EU wants to support a wider bottom-up perspective they should consider old co-operation structures before they establish new cross-border co-operations. If they rather see the Interreg funding as instrument to fund border regions and strengthen the national states as a whole; cross-border co-operations like South Baltic can play an important role.

10 Executive summary

The overall purpose with this thesis has been to consider whether cross-border co-operations in the framework of Interreg are strong enough to undermine the power of the nation-state or whether they on contrary only may be an instrument in order to further the governments' own goals. In order to respond to this a case study on the South Baltic cross-border co-operation was carried out. The aim with the case study has been to answer two operational research questions which are linked to the overall purpose. The first of these questions asks: *What and whom drove the process to establish the South Baltic cross-border co-operation?* The following question addressed is: *How and to what extent can actors at the subnational level contra actors at the national level and the EU influence and determine the South Baltic cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened?* Through the examination of both the establishment process and of how different actors can influence the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained or deepened the intention has been to facilitate the examination regarding whereas cross-border co-operation funded by the Interreg strengthen or undermine the power of the nation-state. It is assumed that; if the process was not driven by subnational actors or if the subnational actors are not compatible to an extent where they single-handedly can influence the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened, then it is not likely that the cross-border co-operation could undermine the power of the nation-state.

The method of the thesis is as mentioned a case study. Moreover, different methods have been applied in order to examine the different kinds of the questions. Concerning the establishment process there were already theories that could be applied and that only partly needed to be adjusted in order to fit the phenomena under study. In contrast, it was necessary to develop an analytical framework for the last research question concerning how different actors can influence and determine the co-operation's opportunity to be maintained and deepened. The developed framework was inspired by the method of Structure – Agency in order to study both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension in similarity to the structure perspective deals both with what structures constrain and also what they enable. That implied that the vertical dimension attempted to clarify the cross-border co-operation's power dependence upon the EU and the national governments, and how the EU and the national governments can enable or constrain a maintaining or deepening of the co-operation. Moreover, the method of ideal types was used in order to contextualise the vertical dimension. The horizontal dimension, in similarity to an agency perspective examined what ability and capacity subnational actors themselves have to maintain or deepen their co-operation.

In order to gather knowledge about the South Baltic co-operation and examine different actors' attitudes fourteen face to face interviews were carried out; three telephone interviews and one questionnaire. Both experts and respondents interviews were applied and the interviews lasted on average 1.5 hour. The interviewees represented different countries and were either a stakeholder at subnational level, at the national level or a representative from the European Commission. One interview was also conducted with the head of the Joint Technical Secretariat and one with the author of the programme.

To summarise the theoretical chapters of the thesis; one chapter focuses on how to analyse the establishment process, another on the vertical dimension and the last on the horizontal dimension. A decision-making model adapted by John W. Kingdon aimed to be the basis of how to understand the establishment process. The chapter was structured after three terms used by Kingdon; the garbage can model, policy windows and policy entrepreneurs. The garbage can model carries relevance when multiple actors are involved in a decision-making process and it clarifies how the outcome depends on how different policy streams are processed and joined. The model's purpose was to enable an illustration of what policy streams that existed before the decision to establish the South Baltic co-operation was taken, in order to compare subnational actors' earlier positions with the outcome. The theory about policy windows explains how policy streams are joining and was aimed to facilitate an explanation of what factors that determined the South Baltic to be established when it was. The policy entrepreneurs are the ones that couple the policy streams and make a decision possible. Whereas the policy entrepreneurs represent the national or subnational level which makes a considerable difference. If the national actors are the driving force it is significant that the cross-border co-operation is an instrument for the states' own policy objectives.

The vertical dimension is theorised through the three regional ideal types; issue network, policy network and policy community. The construction of the ideal types can be seen as categories along a continuum and was inspired by work from B.H Jørgensen and R.A.W. Rhodes. Issue network is the most loose co-operation form and policy community has the closest integrated structure of cross-border co-operation. The ideal types are constructed in order to clarify; hallmarks of different cross-border co-operations, what a maintaining and deepening of the co-operation actually would mean, how power dependence upon the EU and the national governments varies in relation to the ideal types, and consequently how the power of the national governments can be differently affected due to the structure of the co-operation.

The ideal types were also used in the chapter about the horizontal dimension. For a loose form of co-operation like an issue network the counter-parts do not have to be very compatible, but are on the other hand due to limited resources limited in which activities and projects they can carry out. Consequently, an issue network with less operational discretion cannot in comparison to a stronger policy community undermine and challenge the nation-state. If the subnational actors should be able to influence the co-operations' opportunities to be maintained or deepened some factors must be fulfilled. These factors must for example to a

higher extent be more fulfilled if subnational actors' should be able to deepen a policy network towards a policy community, than what for example is required for maintaining an issue network or a policy network. The different factors were divided into three themes; strategic unification and relation resources, knowledge and leadership resources, and mobilisation capacity. For a policy community, which most probably can challenge the power of the national governments within the co-operation area, strategic unification and relation resources implies that the cross-border co-operation should be of an appropriate size in terms of population and geography. Furthermore, the cross-border co-operation should have a shared vision, preferable a common identity, culture and institutional similarities, an understanding of other stakeholders within the co-operation and a mutual trust. Concerning the knowledge resources and the leadership it is for a policy community required that all stakeholders should have access to available information, opportunities to mutually absorb new ideas from each other and knowledge should preferably have different origins. The leadership should be performed from a key person at subnational level. Mobilisation capacity for a policy community implies that the cross-border co-operation should be reinforced by local and regional politicians, is backed up by officers' enthusiasm and has a public support.

From the above mentioned method and theory the South Baltic cross-border co-operation was examined. Concerning the establishment process of the South Baltic co-operation, the process started when the EU opened a so called policy window and for the new cohesion period 2007-13 and declared that land-sea cross-border co-operations could be eligible for Interreg funding. There was then at that point in time a diverse range of policy streams of how to co-operate. The subnational actors who were most committed along the South Baltic lobbied for that the long-lasted cross-border co-operation Euroregion Baltic which embraces the regions of Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden should be transformed into an Interreg programme. However, it was the effort of a policy entrepreneur at national level that primarily was the reason that the South Baltic co-operation was established in the way it is. He, in contrast to subnational actors wanted, in line with the most national governments and the European Commission, bigger programmes that not necessarily were built from old co-operation structures. The outcome became what most national governments had worked for and due to the national level's high influence the establishment process is more comparable with a top-down process than a bottom-up.

The examination of the question about how different actors can influence and determine the co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened started from defining the character of the South Baltic co-operation and stated that the co-operation is from the constructed ideal types most comparable to a policy network. This implies that the co-operation has a high level of power dependence upon the EU and the national states in terms of; financial resources, operational discretion and legal dependence, and power of the nation-state can barely be affected if the co-operation is not deepened towards a policy community. Due to high power dependence; the national level and the EU can to a large extent influence and determine the cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be

deepened or maintained. It was also examined that their reinforcement for the South Baltic co-operation is embedded in a macro-thinking, where the South Baltic co-operation may be an important instrument in order to reach general political objectives as strengthen the national states and the Baltic Sea area. Current co-operation structure is from the national point of view the most optimal. As it is today; representatives from the national governments take part in the decision-making process, control the development of the co-operation and can also take advantage of the co-operation. A deeper co-operation, like the ideal type policy community, would only imply less control by the states and the advantages are from the national point of view estimated to be diminished or unchanged.

However, if the subnational actors are very compatible and have a willingness to co-operate they may also have the opportunity to maintain and deepen their cross-border co-operation. Nevertheless, it was demonstrated that the subnational actors in the South Baltic do not have the capacity to maintain or deepen their co-operation without any external influence. This is due to the fact that they do not fulfill the factors that are required. Strategically they think that the cross-border co-operation do not have an appropriate size of population and geography. The vision about what issue to co-operate in is diverged. There is still after the Cold War quite strong development disparities and cultural and institutional differences between the subnations. The different subnations within the co-operation do also not contribute with knowledge of analogues manner and there is no subnational leadership that could promote a maintaining or deepening of the co-operation. Furthermore, the internal mobilisation is too weak; in terms of subnational politicians' support, officers' enthusiasm and public support.

The final conclusion of the thesis was that; due to the fact that establishment process to a high extent was driven by stakeholders at national level and that it primarily is the EU and the national governments that can influence and determine the South Baltic cross-border co-operation's opportunities to be maintained and deepened, the South Baltic cross-border co-operation is a cross-border co-operation which is in the hands of the national states. To conclude, a cross-border co-operation like the South Baltic co-operation in the framework of Interreg strengthens rather than undermine the nation-state.

11 References

Badersten, Björn, 2002. *Medborgardygd – Den europeiska staden och det offentliga rummets etos*. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur

Baker, Susan, 1996. "Punctured sovereignty, border regions and the environment within the European Union" in O'Dowd, Liam – Wilson, Thomas M. (eds) *Border, Nations and States*. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company

Baker, Susan – Kousis, Maira – Richardson, Dick – Young, Stephen, 1997. *The politics of sustainable development: theory, policy and practice within the European Union*. London: Routledge

Beach, Derek, 2004. "The unseen hand in treaty reform negotiations: the role and influence of the Council Secretariat" in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 11(3).

Beck, Jan Willhelm, 1997. *Netzwerke in der transnationalen Regionalpolitik: Rahmenbedingungen, Funktionsweise, Folgen*. Nomos: Baden-Baden.

Bergström, Göran – Boréus, Kristina, 2005. *Textens mening och mak: metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text- och diskursanalys*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Christensen, Tom – Laegreid – Roness, Paul G. - Røvik, Kjell Arne, 2005. *Organisationsteori för offentlig sektor*. Malmö: Liber ekonomi

Church A. – Reid P, 1999. "Cross-border co-operation, institutionalization and political space across the English Channel" in *Regional Studies, Vol.33(8)*

Donnan, Hastings – Wilson M. Thomas, 2001. *Borders – Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State*. Oxford: Berg

Esaiasson, Peter – Gilljam, Mikael – Oscarsson, Henrik och Wängnerud, Lena, 2005. *Metodpraktikan: Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad*. Upplaga 2:3. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik AB

Flick, Uwe, 2006. *An introduction to qualitative research*. London: Sage Publications

Gerring, John, 2007. *Case Study Research – Principles and Practice*. Cambridge: University Press

Gomm, Roger – Hammersley, Martyn – Foster, Martin, 2000 *Case study method: Key issues, key texts*. London:Sage

Hajer, A. Maarten – Wagenaar, Hendrik, 2003. *Deliberative Policy Analysis – Understanding Governance in the Network Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Hall, Patrik – Sjövik Kristian – Stubbergaard Ylva, 2005. *Nätverk söker förankring: Öresundsregionen i ett demokrati perspektiv*. Lund: Studentlitteratur

Halvorsen, Knut, 1992. *Samhällsvetenskaplig metod*. Lund: Studentlitteratur

Haveri, Arton, 2008. "Evaluation of Change in Local Governance – The Rhetorical Wall and the Politics of Images" in *Evaluation*, Vol 14.2, p. 141-155

Hay, Colin, 2002. *Political Analysis – A Critical Introduction.* New York: Palgrave

Healey, Patsy – Magalhaes, de Claudio – Madanipour, Ali – Pendlebury, John, 2003 "Place identity and local politics: analysing initiatives in deliberative governance" in Hajer, A. Maarten – Wagenaar, Hendrik. *Deliberative Policy Analysis – Understanding Governance in the Network Society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Hill, Michael – Hupe, Peter, 2002. *Implementing Public Policy.* London:Sage Publications Ltd.

Hurell, Andrew, 2007. *On Global Order – Power, Values, and the Constitution of Interantional Society.* Oxford: University Press

Innes E., Judith – Booher E., David, 2003 "Collaborative policymaking: governance through dialogue" in Hajer, A. Maarten – Wagenaar, Hendrik. *Deliberative Policy Analysis – Understanding Governance in the Network Society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Johansson, Roine, 2002. *Nyinstitutionalismen inom organisationsanalysen : en skolbildnings uppkomst, spridning och utveckling.* Lund: Studentlitteratur

Jessop, Bob, 1996. "Interpretative Sociology and the Dialectic of Structure and Agency", in *Theory, Culture and Society* Vol 13:1, p.119-128

Jessop, Bob, 2002. "The Political Economy of Scale" in Perkmann, Markus – Sum Ngai-Ling. *Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions.* Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan

Jerneck, Magnus –Gidlund, Janerik, 2001. *Komplex flernivådemokrati : regional lobbying i Bryssel.* Malmö: Liber ekonomi

Jernek, Magnus, 2007. "Öresund- det gränsregionala ledarskapets problem" in *Öresundsgränser – Rörelser, möten och visioner i tid och rum.* Göteborg: Makadam Förlag

Jordan, Andrew – Schout, Adriaan, 2006. *The Coordination of the European Union – Exploring the capacities of networked governance.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Jönsson, Christer – Tägil, Sven – Törnqvist, Gunnar, 2007. *Europa Quo Vadis – Integration och Splittring i tid och rum.* Stockholm: SNS

Jørgensen, Birte Holst, 1998. *Building European Cross-border Co-operation Structures.* Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science University of Copenhagen.

Kingdon, John W, 2003. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.* Crawfordsville: RR Donnelley & Sons Inc.

Koremenos, Barbara – Lipson, Charles – Snidal, Duncan, 2001 "The Rational Design of International Institutions", in Interantional Organization Vol 55:4 p.761-799

Kvale, Sigrid, 1996. *Interviews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing.* California: Sage Publications

Lavenex Sandra – William, Wallace, 2005. "Justice and Home Affairs" in *Policy-Making in the European Union.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Leresche, Jean Philippe, 2002. "Poltical Frontier Regimes: Toward Cross-Border Governance?" in Perkmann, Markus – Sum Ngai-Ling. *Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan

Marshall, Tim, 1997. "Dimensions of sustainable development and scales of policy-making" in Baker, Susan – Kousis, Maira – Richardson, Dick – Young, Stephen. *The politics of sustainable development : theory, policy and practice within the European Union.* London: Routledge

Moravcsik, Andrew, 1999. " A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation" in *Intenational Organization,* Vol. 53(2)

O'Dowd, Liam – Wilson, Thomas M., 1996. "Frontiers of sovereignty in the new Europe" in O'Dowd, Liam – Wilson, Thomas M. Border, Nations and States. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company

O'Dowd, Liam, 2002. "Transnational integration and cross-border regions in the European Union" in Anderson, James. *Transnational Democracy – Political spaces and border crossing.*

Paasi, Anssi, 1986. *The institutionalization of regions – Theory and comparative case studies.* Joensuu: Unviersity of Joensuu

Passi, Anssi, 2002. "Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows" in Newman David. *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*. London: Frank Cass Publishers

Perkmann, Markus, 1999. *Building Governance Institutions Across European Borders. Regional Studies*, Vol. 33.7, p. 657-667

Perkmann, Markus, 2002. "Euroregions: Institutional Entrepreneurship in the European Union" in Perkmann, Markus – Sum Ngai-Ling. *Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan

Perkmann, Markus – Sum Ngai-Ling, 2002. "Globalisation, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions: Scales, Discourses and Governance" in Perkmann, Markus – Sum Ngai-Ling. *Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions.* Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan

Perkmann, Markus, 2007. Construction of New Territorial Scales: A Framwork and Case Study of the EUREGIO Cross-border Region. *Regional Studies*, Vol 41.2, p. 253-266

Pierson, Paul, 2004. *Politics in time – History institutions and social analysis.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Rhodes, R.A:W, 1997. *Understanding Governance – Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. Buckingham: Open University Press

Scott, James Wesley, 1999. European and North American Contexts for Cross-border Regionalism. *Regional Studies*, Vol 33.7, p. 605-617

Stuart, McAnulla, 2002. "Structure and Agency" in Marsh, David – Stoker Gerry. *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. New York: Palgrave MacMillian

Stubbergaard, Ylva, 2007. "Föreställningen om en gränsregional Öresundsregion" in *Öresundsgränser – Rörelser, möten och visioner i tid och rum*. Göteborg: Makadam Förlag

Östhol, Anders, 1996. *Politisk integration och gränsöverskridande regionbildning i Europa.* Umeå: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen Umeå universitet

Web pages and documents from the European Union

Cohesion policy 2007-13 – Commentaries and official texts, January 2007 Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/baltic/index_en.htm, 30.07.2009
European Regional Policy – The Basic Essentials, January 2007, Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength – Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion, October 2008, Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
*Inforegio panorama – EU Cohesion Policy 1998-2008: Investing in Europe's future, J*une 2008, Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
South Baltic Cross-Border Co-operation Programme – Operational Programme Approved by the European Commission on 20th December 2007,
www.pomerania.net
www.southbaltic.eu

Minutes of the meetings in 2006

Gdansk, 24.05.2006
Szczecin, 28.06.2006
Gdansk, 23.08.2006
Gdansk, 17.10.2006
Karlskrona, 02.11.2006

12 Appendix

12.1 Appendix 1- List of interviewees

AUTHOR   Wiktor Szydarowski, telephone interview, 09.06.2009

EU1   Alekzandra Schotz-Sobczak, Brussels, 19.05.2009
EU2   Anders Lindholm, Brussels, 19.05.2009

JTS   Martha Plichta, Gdansk 12.05.2009

N. GE1   Elke Ording, Schwerin, .14.05.2009
N. GE2   Karl Schmude, Brussels, 18.05.2009
N.GE3   Peter Stein, Schwerin, 13.05.2009
N.LIT   Renata Saplinskaite, E-Mail correspondence, 18.06.2009
N.PL1   Alexandra Rapp, Warsaw, 08.05.2009
N.PL2   Ewa Zukowska, Warsaw, 08.05.2009
N.SWE   Ulf Savbäck, Stockholm, 06.05.2009

SN.DK   Niels Chresten Andersen, telephone interview, 30.4.2009
SN.EUPOM   Stig Ålund, Lund, 26.05.2009
SN.EURBAL   Slawomir Demkowicz – Dobrzanski, Elblag, 11.05.2009
SN.GER   Andreas Schubert, Rostock, 15.05.2009
SN.SWE1   Carina Johnsson, Malmö, 27.04.2009
SN.SWE2   Håkan Brynelsson, telephone interview, 04.06.2009
SN. PL   Robert Mazurkiewicz, Gdansk, 11.05.2009

12.2 Appendix 2 – Map of the eligible area